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PREFACE 
Border control, surveillance operations and expulsion of irregular immigrants – particularly 
through return flights – can pose serious challenges to human rights. Is Europe properly 
equipped to ensure effective access to remedies for alleged rights violations or possible abuses 
of force against immigrants and asylum seekers? 
This book examines whether adequate complaint mechanisms and bodies are in place and to 
what extent they succeed in monitoring and redressing human rights violations in the context 
of border management and joint return flights. It makes three main contributions to the current 
policy and academic debate. 
First, it sheds light on the fragmentation of the human rights accountability regimes that 
currently apply to the various national and EU authorities and actors involved in border 
management and expulsions of irregular immigrants. 
Second, it shows that while the ‘law on the books’ may formally recognise a set of fundamental 
rights for immigrants and asylum seekers, the ‘law in practice’ does not necessarily offer 
effective access to justice through complaint mechanisms in many European states. 
Third, the book sets out a number of policy recommendations aimed at ensuring access to 
effective remedies for violations of the human rights of migrants and asylum seekers that might 
occur in extraterritorial and dispersed locations (such as in cooperation with or in territories of 
third countries), and in the context of joint return flights aimed at expelling irregular 
immigrants. Particular attention is paid to issues with access to justice in the context of activities 
undertaken by the new European Border and Coast Guard (Frontex). 
The research presented in this book was supported by the Office of the Special Representative 
on Migration and Refugees of the Council of Europe. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Border control and surveillance activities and expulsion operations of irregular immigrants 
entail the adoption of actions or decisions that are particularly sensitive from a human rights 
perspective. These activities involve the use of executive powers – and in some cases even 
force, and their impact on human rights has been widely documented across Europe.1 
By monitoring and reporting abuses, human rights treaty bodies and independent organisations 
contribute to the accountability of law enforcement authorities. A knowledge gap exists 
regarding the administrative remedies or ‘complaint mechanisms’ available to third country 
nationals – immigrants and asylum seekers – who may be victims of misconduct and violence 
or ill-treatment in the context of migration and border management practices. 
The need to address this gap becomes particular crucial, in particular in light of the process of 
progressive externalisation and militarisation of border management and migration control 
practices, and more generally in the wider context of deterioration in the rule of law across the 
EU. Is Europe properly equipped to ensure effective access to remedies for alleged rights 
violations or possible abuse of force against immigrants and asylum seekers? How can there be 
access to effective remedies for violations of human rights of migrants and asylum seekers that 
might occur in remote and dispersed locations such as the high sea, or in the context of joint 
return flights? How can the risks of impunity that arise from practical obstacles to monitoring 
and implementing respect of existing standards be reduced?    
This book examines the existence and effectiveness of mechanisms that, without prejudice to 
formal judicial remedies, have the objective of overseeing, investigating and redressing human 
rights violations that occur in the context of border management and joint return flights. The 
geographical scope of the assessment covers a selection of Council of Europe (CoE) countries: 
Austria, Bulgaria, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Poland, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, Spain and Turkey. 
The following research areas are investigated: 
 First, the human rights responsibilities and related accountability regimes applicable to 
the wide range of authorities entrusted with the management of land, air, and sea 
borders, and the conduct of expulsion operations, and in particular, joint return flights. 
 Second, the features that complaint mechanisms must possess in order to qualify as 
effective in light of the standards developed under the European Convention on Human 
                                                     
1 Among the many sources available see, for instance, Border Violence Monitoring, Statistical overview: January 
to November 2017, 01.12.2017. 
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Rights (ECHR)2 and other regional and international legal instruments relevant to 
human rights. 
 Third, the existence of institutions and bodies currently responsible for receiving and 
handling human rights complaints, the extent to which they are accessible in practice, 
and also whether they are entitled to conduct independent investigations and redress 
abuses. 
Section I starts by providing an overview of the main human rights standards that delineate the 
boundaries of the executive powers of national authorities in border management activities 
and joint return operations. The overview takes into account the legal standards developed by 
the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), while also paying attention to the fundamental 
rights obligations enshrined in European Union (EU) primary and secondary legislation. It takes 
stock of the cases and circumstances in which human rights obligations apply to CoE State 
Parties’ authorities conducting border control and border surveillance activities and/or 
expulsion operations. The section then analyses in depth the guarantees that oversight bodies 
and accountability mechanisms need to offer in order to secure the substance of the rights and 
freedoms enshrined in international and regional human rights instruments applicable to 
border management activities and joint return procedures. There is a particular focus on the 
structural and functional features that the different authorities responsible for receiving and 
handling complaints against decisions undertaken in the context of border checks and return 
procedures must exhibit in order to qualify as a ‘complaint mechanism’. For the purposes of 
this book, the oversight bodies existing at the local, national, and supranational level qualify as 
‘complaint mechanisms’ when i) they offer a form of protection which is supplementary to 
judicial remedies, and ii) are equipped with the powers and procedural guarantees required 
under the ECHR and other relevant human right instruments to ensure third country nationals 
a sufficient level of protection against abuses committed in the context of border management 
activities or during expulsion procedures.  
Section II focuses on the analysis of the institutional landscape of actors responsible for the 
implementation of the multi-layered legal framework laying down the human rights obligations 
governing border management and expulsion procedures. The section highlights the gaps in 
protection deriving from the differences in the accountability regimes to which the various law 
enforcement and security actors currently participating in border control, border surveillance 
and expulsion operations are subject. It then identifies the different types of internal and 
external accountability bodies and institutions that the 11 countries studied in this book have 
created (if any) to allow complaints by third country nationals against human rights violations 
occurring in the context of border control, border surveillance and joint return operations. A 
                                                     
2 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms Rome, 4.XI.1950, as amended. 
Among the many sources available see, for instance, Border Violence Monitoring, A project documenting illegal 
push-backs and police violence inflicted by EU member state authorities, mainly on the borders of Serbia/Croatia 
and Serbia/Hungary, https://www.borderviolence.eu/. 
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dedicated case study addresses the current state of play in the implementation of the 
mechanism established under Article 72 of Regulation (EU) 2016/1624.3  
Section III verifies whether the existing oversight bodies do in fact qualify as ‘complaint 
mechanisms’. It does so by testing the extent to which the structures and procedures 
established by the CoE meet existing standards on effective complaint mechanisms and grant 
access to justice and effective remedies to third country nationals whose human rights have 
been violated. Through scrutiny of the type of procedures that can be activated to prevent and 
redress abuses committed at the borders and in the context of returns, the section examines 
the role played by existing and available oversight bodies in monitoring and holding 
accountable national authorities responsible for abuses or misconduct. In particular, the 
section identifies a series of practical, legal, and procedural challenges currently affecting the 
possibility of lodging complaints and accessing effective remedies for human rights violations 
by law enforcement authorities and other security actors operating at land, air, and sea 
borders, or in the context of expulsion operations, and in particular joint return flights. 
The conclusions highlight existing shortcomings in the human rights accountability regimes of 
the authorities of CoE State Parties involved in border and migration management. Particular 
attention is paid to the risks of impunity arising from the lack of robust independent monitoring 
bodies and effective complaint mechanisms. Based on key research findings, the book proposes 
a series of recommendations in the form of practical suggestions that could be adopted in 
developing a European system of ‘portable justice’. This system would aim at enhancing existing 
human rights protection instruments by primarily securing and improving access to effective 
judicial and non-judicial remedies against fundamental human rights abuses or cases of 
mistreatment suffered by individuals in the context of border control and surveillance, as well 
as joint return flights.    
Scope and methodology  
The book pays attention to the effectiveness of mechanisms available for complaining about 
and accessing remedies for human rights violations that might occur throughout the 
performance of border management activities,4 and in conducting joint return operations by 
air.5 By doing so, the analysis concentrates on a selection of Southern (Greece, Italy, Spain), 
                                                     
3 Regulation (EU) 2016/1624 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 September 2016 on the 
European Border and Coast Guard and amending Regulation (EU) 2016/399 of the European Parliament and of 
the Council and repealing Regulation (EC) No 863/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council, Council 
Regulation (EC) No 2007/2004 and Council Decision 2005/267/EC. 
4 In EU law, the concept of border management encompasses actions and/or decisions undertaken in the context 
of both: border control and border surveillance. See Monar, J., (2006), ‘The External Shield of the Area of Freedom, 
Security and Justice: Progress and Deficits of the Integrated Management of External EU Borders”, in J. de Zwaan 
and F. A. N. J. Goudappel (eds), Freedom, Security and Justice in the European Union: Implementation of The 
Hague Programme, T.M.C. Asser Press, The Hague, pp. 73-90. 
5 See Frontex (2016), Guide for Joint Return Operations by Air coordinated by Frontex, Warsaw, 12 May 2016. In 
the document, Joint Return Operation by Air is defined as an “operation aimed at the removal of illegally present 
third-country nationals by air. The initiative for such an operation is to be taken by one Member State, which will 
invite the participation of others”. 
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Central (Austria, Hungary Poland, Slovakia) and Eastern (Bulgaria, Romania, Serbia, Turkey) 
European countries that are CoE State Parties.  
The 11 countries were selected to reflect the specific human rights accountability challenges 
that currently arise from the implementation of border management activities and joint 
expulsion operations across different European land, sea, and air borders. This selection also 
makes it possible to assess the extent to which different national legal systems and institutional 
frameworks foresee and allow the activation of complaints in accordance with the standards 
that different CoE institutions and bodies have developed (and to which all CoE State Parties 
are committed) in order to prevent and redress human rights violations experienced by 
individuals during border management and expulsion procedures.  
The research is based on information collected through desk research and a set of semi-
structured interviews with members of the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture 
(CPT), officials from the International Organization for Migration (IOM) and the The UN Refugee 
Agency (UNHCR), representatives from EU institutions and agencies, and non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs). An e-questionnaire facilitated gathering expert knowledge from scholars, 
civil society organisations, national human rights institutions (NHRIs), Ombudspersons, and law 
enforcement authorities operating in the 11 countries under study. A total of 29 responses to 
the questionnaire were received between August and November 2017. An Expert Workshop 
involving national experts from all countries covered was also held at the Council of Europe 
premises in Strasbourg on the 20th of November 2017 to present, test and complement the 
preliminary findings of the research. 
A special mention should go to the valuable inputs received from the academics and 
practitioners who took part in the expert workshop and/or contributed to the data collection 
exercise conducted in the 11 countries. The authors would like to thank and acknowledge the 
country contributions provided by the following national experts: Dr. Iker Barbero (Spain); Dr. 
Lami Bertan Tokuzlu (Turkey); Dr. Ulrike Brandl (Austria); Dr. Giuseppe Campesi (Italy); Rados 
Djurovic (Serbia); Dr. Francina Esteve-Garcia (Spain); Dr. Mariona Illamola Dausà (Spain); András 
Léderer (Hungary); Dr. Eleni Koutsouraki (Greece); Barbora Messova (Slovakia); Dr. Madalina 
Moraru (Romania,); Felicia Nica (Romania); Dr. Andriani Papadopoulou (Greece); Radostina 
Pavlova (Bulgaria); Vladimir Petronjevic (Serbia); Dr. Jari Pirjola (Finland); Diana Radoslavova 
(Bulgaria); Anna Serra Gironès (Spain); Zuzana Števulová (Slovakia); Sonja Toskovic (Serbia); Dr. 
Judit Toth (Hungary); Daniel Witko (Poland). 
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1. EFFECTIVE COMPLAINT MECHANISMS IN LIGHT OF REGIONAL AND 
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW  
 Key findings  
 Portability of fundamental human rights safeguards: The human rights obligations that 
derive from a country’s participation in the CoE impose the observance of specific 
human rights standards and procedural guarantees applying to border management 
activities and expulsion operations. Responsibility to safeguard and comply with these 
human rights standards follow wherever State actors perform border controls, 
surveillance and migration management activities. In the CoE, this entails situations 
where authorities have de facto or de jure control (including extra-territorial jurisdiction) 
and, in the EU legal system, whenever their activities fall within the scope of EU law 
(Portable Responsibility). If a human rights violation occurs in a situation falling under 
such circumstances, the individuals concerned should be granted access to an effective 
right of complaint and seek administrative and judicial remedies before the competent 
authorities. 
 
 Third country nationals have the right to activate complaint mechanisms providing access 
to effective judicial and non-judicial remedies against human rights violations. CoE State 
Parties have the obligation to develop oversight and redress mechanisms directed at 
receiving and handling complaints and provide judicial and non-judicial remedies against 
fundamental human rights abuses and cases of mistreatments or maladministration that 
actually occur in the context of border management activities and expulsion operations 
by air. 
 
 An effective remedy can only be provided by a complaint mechanism that is 
institutionally independent and accessible in practice. There must also be an adequate 
capacity to conduct thorough and prompt investigations based on evidence. Only when 
an oversight body meets these minimum safeguards can it qualify as an effective 
complaint mechanism in line with the standards elaborated under regional, international 
and supranational human rights law. Specific standards apply to mechanisms for 
complaints procedures about abuses in the context of joint expulsions, where complaints 
must also have a suspensive effect. 
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1.1 A multi-layered human rights legal and policy framework 
A wealth of human rights standards has been developed at the international and regional level 
with regard to sovereign decisions by states to allow or refuse entry and expel irregular 
immigrants. These legal standards apply both to border management and immigration control 
activities and contribute to defining state responsibilities vis-à-vis non-nationals who undergo 
checks at the borders, are apprehended in a situation of irregularity during border patrolling 
operations, or may be subjected to expulsion procedures by air. 
1.1.1  The Scope of Jurisdiction under the ECHR 
All the CoE State Parties are subject to the obligation to guarantee the set of rights and liberties 
enshrined in the ECHR when controlling the entry, residence and expulsion of aliens. These 
rights and liberties extend to every person within a State Party’s jurisdiction (Article 1 ECHR). 
In accordance with settled European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) case law, this also includes 
third country nationals or stateless persons that, being under the effective control of a CoE 
contracting party, are entitled to receive protection under the ECHR.6 The entitlement arises 
when immigrants and/or asylum seekers enter into contact with a State Party’s authorities, 
regardless of whether the executive action of the latter take place within or outside the national 
territory (e.g. in international waters).7 The rights that the ECHR recognises for third country 
nationals include, inter alia, the right not to be deprived of life8, the right not to suffer ill-
treatment amounting to torture,9 as well as the right not to be unlawfully deprived of liberty.10  
Responsibility to comply with these human rights therefore extends beyond the borders of CoE 
countries. The applicability of the ECHR is contingent on Article 1 ECHR, which states that “the 
High Contracting Parties shall secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and 
freedoms defined in Section I of this Convention”. On a number of occasions, the ECtHR has 
interpreted this provision to include certain instances of extraterritorial exercise of jurisdiction, 
especially where the country concerned exercises effective control of an area outside its 
national territory.11  
In the landmark ruling of Hirsi Jamaa and other v Italy, the ECtHR held that – in the context of 
the ‘push-back operations’ to Libya by Italian armed forces – Italy had assumed both continuous 
and exclusive de jure and de facto control over the applicants.12 The Strasbourg Court clearly 
established that practices of CoE country authorities, such as transferring a migrant boat to an 
intercepting patrol ship, evidently place the affected individual within the effective control of 
                                                     
6 European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), Issa and others v. Turkey, 16.11.2004, (Application no. 31821/96), 
para. 71. 
7 Ibid., paras 73-75.  
8 ECtHR, Solomou et al. v. Turkey, 24.06.2008. 
9 ECtHR, Ribitsch v. Austria, 4.12.1995. 
10 ECtHR, Kuznetsov v. Ukraine, 29.04.2003, and; ECtHR, Ilascu et al. v. Russia and Moldova (GC), 8.07.2004. 
11 ECtHR, Loizidou v Turkey (Preliminary Objections), para. 62. 
12 ECtHR, Hirsi Jamaa et al. v. Italy (GC), 23.12.2012, paras. 73 and 81. 
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the relevant state.13 More recently, the ECtHR has confirmed its Hirsi doctrine of de jure and de 
facto control in respect of extraterritorial jurisdiction in N.D. and N.T. v Spain.14 In the latter 
case, the Strasbourg Court restated that the obligation of Spanish authorities to ensure ECHR 
standards derives from the effective control exercised over the third country nationals who 
trespass the fence built between Morocco and Spain, and does not depend on questions of 
territoriality (i.e. irrespective of whether the border fence is located in Spanish or Moroccan 
territory).  
1.2.1  Portable responsibility under the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights  
The safeguards provided under the ECHR are also guaranteed by the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights of the European Union (EU Charter), which has the same legal value as the EU Treaties. 
Article 52(3) of the Charter states that, without prejudice to a more extensive protection, the 
meaning and scope of the rights for which it provides shall be the same as those laid down by 
the ECHR.15 At the same time, the EU Charter provides for even greater possibilities to control 
the action of agents of the EU and its member states (MS) when they act within the scope of 
EU law.16 In particular, it spells out the rights and principles that apply to the authorities of EU 
MS when they implement EU law regulating border checks, border surveillance and returns.17 
In all cases where the administrative and law enforcement action of MS and EU agencies falls 
under the scope of Schengen rules and other relevant EU legal and policy instruments, the 
fundamental rights safeguards provided by the Charter apply, irrespective of the fact that such 
action is conducted outside the EU’s geographical borders.18 
The material and personal scope of application of the EU Charter aims at guaranteeing that the 
notion of ‘responsibility’ in the EU legal system follows a functional or parallel approach.19 
Compliance with the Charter must be maintained irrespective of where and under whose 
                                                     
13 See N.W. Frenzen, (2017), “The legality of Frontex operation practices”, in T. Gammeltoft-Hansen and J. 
Vedsted-Hansen (eds), Human rights and the dark side of globalisation: Transnational law enforcement and 
migration control, Routledge Studies in Human Rights, p. 305.  
14 ECtHR, N.D. and N.T. v Spain, 03.10.2017, para. 54. 
15 Among the most important rights provided by the EU Charter that are of particular relevance during border 
checks, there are: human dignity (Article 1); the prohibition of torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment (Article 4); the right to liberty and security (Article 6); respect for private and family life (Article 7); the 
protection of personal data (Article 8); the right to asylum and protection in the event of removal, expulsion or 
extradition (Articles 18 and 19); non-discrimination (Article 21); the rights of the child (Article 24); the right to 
a good administration (Article 41); and the right to an effective remedy (Article 47). 
16 Article 51(1) of the Charter stresses that: “the provisions of this Charter are addressed to the institutions, bodies, 
offices and agencies of the Union with due regard for the principle of subsidiarity and to the Member States only 
when they are implementing Union law”.  
17 In line with Article 51 of the EU Charter, it has to be assessed on a case-by-case basis whether national activities 
in the field of border control are to be considered an implementation of Union law to which EU fundamental rights 
standards apply. See CJEU C-23/12, Zakaria, ECLI:EU:C:2013:24, paras 39-41. 
18 See V. Moreno-Lax and C. Costello (2014), “The Extraterritorial Application of the EU Charter of Fundamental 
Rights: From Territoriality to Facticity, the Effectiveness Model”, in S. Peers et al. (eds) The EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights, Oxford: Hart Publishing, pp.1700-1727. 
19 Ibid., pp. 1657-1683. 
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control and executive actions effectively take place, and regardless of the territorial connection 
with the EU. This falls into what could be denominated as portable responsibility. And that is 
also the case even where EU law leaves discretion or margins of appreciation to MS in 
implementation phases: such discretion must be exercised in light of the EU Charter. 
A restrictive interpretation of the scope of EU law might hamper the accountability of EU and 
non-EU actors currently involved in the field of border control and expulsions.20 However, the 
scope of the fundamental rights obligations and related operational administrative standards 
applying to MS has progressively expanded, in particular through the integration of the 
Schengen acquis in the EU legal order, the establishment of common EU external borders, and 
the consequent adoption of so-called ‘flanking’ or ‘compensatory measures’.  
The Schengen Borders Code (SBC)21 establishes that the authorities of EU MS entrusted with 
border control and surveillance functions have the responsibility to ensure that the measures 
they undertake in the context of these activities fully respects human dignity, are proportionate 
to the objectives pursued, and do not discriminate on grounds of sex, racial or ethnic origin, 
religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation.22 The Regulation for the surveillance of 
EU external sea borders23 also provides for human rights standards to be respected by 
authorities that conduct sea border patrolling activities including, for instance, boarding and 
stopping vessels, conducting a vessel to a third country, or handing over a vessel to the 
authorities of a third country.24 
In the field of expulsions, the Return Directive subjects the use of coercive measures to the 
principles of proportionality and effectiveness with regard to the means used and objectives 
pursued.25 The Directive encourages the use of voluntary departures over forced removals26, 
and provides for a series of safeguards to which third country nationals in irregular situations 
are entitled to while their removal is pending.27 Despite not being legally binding, the recently 
revised EU Return Handbook provides further indications “relating to the performance of duties 
of national authorities competent for carrying out return related tasks, including police, border 
guards, migration authorities, staff of detention facilities and monitoring bodies”. The main goal 
                                                     
20 See C. Costello (2016), “The Human Rights of Migrants and Refugees in European Law”, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
21 Regulation (EU) 2016/399 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 March 2016 on a Union Code on 
the rules governing the movement of persons across borders (Schengen Borders Code).  
22 See Article 7 SBC. 
23 Regulation (EU) No 656/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 establishing rules 
for the surveillance of the external sea borders in the context of operational cooperation coordinated by the 
European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States 
of the European Union. 
24 For the fundamental rights challenges that emerge in the context of border surveillance at sea, see the European 
Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA) (2013), Fundamental rights at Europe’s southern sea borders.  
25 Directive 2008/115/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2008 on common 
standards and procedures in Member States for returning illegally staying third-country nationals, Recital 13. 
26 Ibid, Article 7. 
27 Ibid, Article 14. 
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of the Handbook is to ensure respect of the fundamental rights set forth in the EU Return 
Directive.28 
1.3.1  The right to an effective remedy and good administration, and the role of 
complaint mechanisms 
By ratifying the ECHR, and adopting and implementing other regional and international human 
rights instruments governing the management of borders and the enforcement of immigration 
legislation (including expulsions), CoE State Parties have willingly assumed a number of legal 
responsibilities that are both substantial and procedural in nature. Compliance with these 
human rights obligations is central to both the loyal and sincere cooperation between CoE State 
Parties, and the legitimacy of their action in international relations. 
Substantive obligations entail the adoption and implementation of rules of conduct directed at 
ensuring that the States’ authorities fully respect relevant standards regarding fundamental 
human rights protection in the performance of their border and migration management tasks. 
For instance, and with regard to the personal/institutional scope of the obligation to protect 
the rights enshrined in the ECHR (and in particular those embodied in Articles 2 and 3), the 
ECtHR has stated that the “higher authorities” of the Contracting States are under the duty to 
require their subordinates – including law enforcement authorities and the police – to comply 
with the Convention.29  
Procedural obligations involve the design and development of oversight standards and 
mechanisms directed at delivering those standards in practice by receiving and handling 
complaints, and at providing effective remedies when these are not complied with in the 
context of border control procedures, border surveillance practices, and expulsion operations. 
Besides rights and freedoms, the ECHR also provides guarantees aimed at reinforcing the 
efficacy of these very rights and freedoms. Article 13 of the Convention provides the right to 
an effective remedy. The ECtHR has interpreted this provision of the Convention as a guarantee 
for everyone who claims that his/her rights and freedoms under the ECHR have been violated.30 
The rationale for Article 13 is precisely to secure the substance of the rights and freedoms 
guaranteed in the ECHR. According to the ECtHR, the remedy must not necessarily be of a 
judicial nature to enforce a substantial breach of human rights. In fact, through its 
jurisprudence, the Strasbourg Court has established that if judicial remedies are not provided, 
the effectiveness of a remedy depends on the specific “powers and procedural guarantees of 
                                                     
28 See European Commission, C(2017) 6505, ANNEX to the Commission Recommendation establishing a common 
“Return Handbook” to be used by Member States’ competent authorities when carrying out return related tasks, 
Annex I. 
29 See, for instance, ECtHR, Assanidzé v. Georgia, 8.04.2004. 
30 ECtHR, Klass et al. v. the Federal Republic of Germany, 6.09.1978. 
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the alternative remedies” (i.e. administrative) provided by the CoE State Party institutional and 
legal system.31 
Article 13 of the ECHR also gives effect to the principle of subsidiarity, namely by establishing 
that proper domestic remedies are made available to individuals before they have recourse to 
the ECtHR. This, in turn, translates into a positive obligation for State Parties to establish 
dedicated mechanisms for lodging administrative and judicial complaints through which a non-
national may claim – before a national authority and according to national law – that a decision 
taken in the context of border check or border surveillance, or in the framework of an expulsion 
operation allegedly violates a Convention right, for instance, Article 2, 3, or 8 ECHR.32 
A set of international standards or criteria have been progressively elaborated at the CoE and 
also at the EU and international level to clarify the features that ‘complaint instruments’ or 
‘mechanisms’ should exhibit in order to address effectively allegations of human rights 
violations and misconduct/violence by border guards and other relevant law enforcement 
authorities in the scope of migration management activities. 
1.4.1 Effective complaints mechanisms and investigations in light of the ECHR and the 
CPT 
ECtHR jurisprudence has helped in specifying what a remedy should look like in order to be 
considered effective in the meaning of the Convention. According to the Strasbourg Court’s 
case law, a remedy vis-à-vis claimed fundamental rights violations deriving from actions or 
decisions taken against third country nationals in the scope of border control activities and 
return operations must:  
 First, exist institutionally, although it does not necessarily need to depend on a judicial 
authority, but can also be provided by other bodies of an administrative nature (e.g. an 
Ombudsperson) with the authority to ensure the effectiveness of the remedy in 
practice. This requires the power to conduct an effective investigation based, where 
necessary, on examinations by medical professionals into the allegations made by the 
complainant.33  
 Second, be adequate, allowing the competent national authority to deal with the 
substance of the complaint and grant appropriate relief, through an assessment of the 
risks with reference to the facts which were known or ought to be known to the state 
(for instance, at the time of expulsion). For this scope, the scrutiny conducted by a 
national authority must be close, independent and rigorous,34 and ensured without 
                                                     
31 See also D. Shelton (2014), “Art. 47 – Right to an Effective Remedy”, in S. Peers, T. Hervey, J. Kenner, A. Ward 
(eds), The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights: A Commentary, Hart Publishing, Oxford, p. 1202. 
32 H. Lambert (2007), “The position of aliens in relation to the European Convention on Human Rights”, Human 
Rights File, No 8, Council of Europe Publishing, p. 59.  
33 ECtHR, Silver et al. v. the United Kingdom, 25.03.1983, para. 113. See also ECtHR Leander v. Sweden, 26.03.1987, 
paras. 29-30, and ECtHR, Klass et al. v, para 67. 
34 ECtHR, M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece (GC), paras. 293 and 387. 
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regard to what the person may have done, for instance, to warrant expulsion or any 
perceived threat to the national security of the expelling state.35 
 Third, be available, the remedy must be prompt, accessible and not hindered by the acts 
of the state authorities.36 Promptness of the proceedings for the assessment of the 
complaint should not prevail over the effectiveness of the remedy. The ECtHR found 
that accelerated proceedings may lead to a superficial examination of the applicant’s 
claim and deprive him/her of a fair and reasonable opportunity to challenge a 
decision.37 With specific regard to Article 2 of the ECHR, the Strasbourg Court has 
clarified that in order to provide an effective remedy against a decision which allegedly 
violates the non-refoulement principle, a complaint mechanism must be not only be 
available in practice, provide for independent and rigorous scrutiny, and prompt 
response,38 but it must also have an automatic suspensive effect.39 
The ECtHR also stressed that a duty exists for the state to investigate allegations of serious ill-
treatment committed by a state agent against aliens. The duty of states to pursue thorough 
investigations for ill-treatment of aliens also have also been extended to cases of alleged 
violation by private individuals.40 According to the Strasbourg Court this entails “an obligation 
to provide a complete and sufficient explanation as to how the injuries were caused”, and 
therefore requires official investigations to be conducted.41 The ECtHR specified that in case of 
complaints brought against the police and engaging in particular Article 2 or 3 of the ECHR, 
investigations must meet the following standards: 
 Independence and impartiality, excluding institutional or hierarchical connections 
between the investigators and the officer subject of the complaint.42 
 Thoroughness, entailing the gathering of evidence that allow for the assessment of the 
facts of the case and the identification and punishment of those responsible.43 The 
hearing of the officer as a suspect and critical analysis of his/her statements is also an 
obligation to fulfil in order to ensure effective investigations.44  
                                                     
35 Judgment of 25 September 1997, para 107. 
36 ECtHR, Muminov v. Russia, 11 .12.2008, para 100. 
37 ECtHR, I.M. v. France, 2.02.2012, paras 130, 147-14, and 154. 
38 See M.S.S. v. Belgium & Greece, paras 283-293.   
39 See Hirsi Jamaa et al. v. Italy, op. cit., paras 199-200; and ECtHR, Gebremedhin v. France, 26.04.2007, para 58; 
it is sufficient if one court has the option to decide before removal; a final decision of a court of last instance is not 
required.  
40 ECtHR, M.C. v. Bulgaria. 
41 ECtHR, Assenov et. al v. Bulgaria. 28.10.1998.  
42 ECtHR, Halat v. Turkey, 8.11.2011; Mocanu et al. v Romania, 17.09.2014. 
43 ECtHR, Aksoy v. Turkey, 18.12.1996; Alder v United Kingdom, 22.11.2011. 
44 ECtHR, Ramsahai v. The Netherlands, 15.05.2007. 
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 Promptness, to prevent risks of evidence loss through delay,45 and maintain confidence 
in the rule of law.46 Initial protection of potential evidence must also be ensured.47 
 Publicity, openness and transparency, also allowing for the complainant to be involved 
in the complaints process in order to safeguard his or her legitimate interests. 
From the overview provided above, it follows that the non-respect of procedural obligations 
specific to Article 3 (or Article 2) of the ECHR can result in a violation of Article 3 (or 2) “in just 
the same way as the non-respect of the substantive obligation would”.48  
As for the safeguards relating to the expulsion of aliens (primarily regulated by Article 1 of 
Protocol no. 7 to the ECHR),49 the ECtHR has also applied Article 13 in conjunction with other 
provisions of the Convention in order to clarify the type of remedies that must be made 
available by State Parties. For instance, it has stated that “where there is an arguable claim that 
such an expulsion may infringe the foreigner’s right to respect for family life, Article 13 in 
conjunction with Article 8 of the Convention requires that States must make available to the 
individual concerned the effective possibility of challenging the deportation  order” and of 
having the issues “examined with sufficient procedural safeguards and thoroughness by an 
appropriate domestic forum offering adequate guarantees of independence and 
impartiality”.50 
Beside the ECtHR, the CPT has also provided important guidance and indications as to the 
features that allow oversight instruments to be effective, and therefore qualify as ‘complaint 
mechanisms’.  The CPT has in particular indicated the role that complaint mechanism should 
play in the context of immigration detention, and more specifically during the deportation of 
foreign nationals by air, as reported in the box below. 
Box 1. CPT recommendations on effective complaints mechanisms  
As a result of its most recent visits to Spain and Italy, the CPT reinstated the importance that 
during a joint removal operation, effective complaints procedures “both internal and 
external are set up to allow for any complaints from detainees about their treatment by law 
enforcement officers”.51 
                                                     
45 ECtHR, Kaya v. Turkey, 19.02.1998. 
46 ECtHR, Aydin v. Turkey, 25.09.1997. 
47 ECtHR, Alder v. United Kingdom, 22.11.2011. 
48 See H. Lambert (2007), op. cit., p. 59.  
49 This provision establishes that an alien lawfully resident can be expelled from the territory of a State Party only 
in pursuance of a decision reached in accordance with law and has the right to submit reasons against his 
expulsion, to have his case reviewed and to be legally represented. Such procedural safeguards can be restricted 
when the expulsion is necessary in the interests of public order or is grounded on reasons of national security. The 
provision is modelled on article 13 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 
50 ECtHR, Al-Nashif v. Bulgaria 20.06.1992, para.133. 
51 See in particular, CPT Report to the Italian Government on the visit to Italy carried out by the European 
Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT) from 16 to 
18 December 2015, CPT/Inf (2016) 33, p, 18. 
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The CPT has further specified that in order to qualify as “accessible in practice” such 
procedures must give returnees the possibility to file a complaint “either immediately upon 
arrival or on board the plane prior to arrival”. 
In addition, it was confirmed that the external procedure should “meet the requirements of 
independence” and “offer guarantees that complaints will be dealt with effectively, 
expediently and thoroughly”.52 
These are the necessary requirements, which according to the CPT, would allow for a 
complaint mechanism to effectively determine responsibilities, sanction those responsible, 
and prevent further rights violations. 
 
Further guidance as to the nature, characteristics and specific role played by complaint 
mechanisms in the context of immigration detention, also in the framework of expulsion 
operations and removal procedures, has been elaborated through the work of a wide range of 
international, regional and national bodies and stakeholders including international and 
national monitoring bodies, United Nations Special Procedures, international organisations and 
civil society.53 
Among the additional features that international and regional human rights institutions and 
bodies have recognised as essential for the effectiveness of complaint mechanisms in the 
context of immigration detention, and which also apply to expulsions procedures and joint 
return flights, two are of particular relevance: access to information (detainees ought to be 
informed of complaint procedures and understand how to access them);54 and also procedural 
clarity and fairness, and respect to privacy and confidentiality.55 Furthermore, when addressing 
their complaints, returnees should be free from intimidation and reprisals.56 This also means 
that attempts to prevent complaints should not be tolerated.57 
1.5.1  Effective complaints in light of EU law 
In the EU legal system, a guarantee corresponding to Article 13 of the ECHR is provided under 
Article 47 of the EU Charter. This last provision expressly grants the right to an effective remedy 
to any person whose rights and freedoms protected under EU law have been violated, including 
in the context of border checks and return procedures. Since it imposes that the right to an 
effective remedy must be granted by “a tribunal”, and it does not only just refer to a remedy 
                                                     
52 Ibid. 
53 See Association for the Prevention of Torture, Practical manual on Monitoring Immigration Detention.  
54 United Nations, Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners, 30 August 1955, para 35.1 and 2. 
55 Ibid. para 36. 
56 See Council of Europe Committee Of Ministers, Recommendation Rec(2006)2 of the Committee of Ministers to 
member states on the European Prison Rules (Adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 11 January 2006 at the 
952nd meeting of the Ministers' Deputies), para 70.4. 
57 Ibid. 
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before “a national authority”, Article 47 of the EU Charter seems to require a higher level of 
protection than that provided by Article 13 of the ECHR.58  
Besides protecting “classic fundamental rights”, the EU Charter also requires administrative 
rights – and in particular the right to good administration (Article 41) – to be respected. This 
right applies to everyone within the scope of the Charter, including third-country nationals 
whose legal position is regulated by EU law in the context of border and expulsion procedures. 
Article 41 of the EU Charter is directed at EU institutions and bodies – including EU Agencies, 
like the European Border and Coast Guard (EBCG), but also applies as a general principle to MS 
authorities responsible for the implementation of EU law. 
The fundamental right to good administration is of central importance when testing the 
effectiveness of complaint mechanisms and remedies in the scope of EU law. In fact, it requires 
that human rights considerations are taken appropriately into account by authorities 
responsible for implementing border control, border surveillance and/or return operations. It 
also entails a right for third country nationals to be heard before any individual measure that 
would affect him or her adversely is taken, and to have any damage caused by the EU 
institutions or their servants in the performance of their duties made good, in accordance with 
the general principles common to the laws of the MS. Being entrusted with the mandate to 
conduct inquiries into cases of maladministration by EU institutions, bodies, offices and 
agencies,59 the European Ombudsman has an important role to play when it comes to 
monitoring and ensuring the respect of fundamental rights of migrants who are subject to 
forced returns to their countries of origin.60  
At the same time, the characteristics of bodies responsible for handling complaints and the 
type of remedies they are entitled to grant against decisions undertaken in the context of 
border management and expulsions are specified in EU secondary legislation. This is the case 
for instance of the SBC (Article 14(3)), and the Return Directive (Article 13), as progressively 
interpreted by the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU). The latter has been 
repeatedly asked by means of requests for preliminary rulings to specify the nature (i.e. judicial 
or administrative) that national bodies handling complaints related, for instance, to a refusal of 
entry of an alien at the EU borders, must present.61  
EU law provides indications with regard to the type of mechanisms that MS must put in place 
to allow third country nationals to complain about decisions undertaken in the context of 
border control procedures and returns of third country nationals. Article 14(3) of the SBC 
requires MS to grant third country nationals the possibility to appeal against a border guard’s 
                                                     
58 See D. Shelton (2014), op. cit., p. 1210.  
59 See Articles 20, 24 and 228 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) and Article 43 of the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. 
60 See, for instance, European Ombudsman Press Release no. 20/2014, Fundamental rights and forced returns of 
migrants: Ombudsman opens investigation, 22 October 2014. 
61 See J.J. Rijpma (2017), “External Migration and Asylum Management: Accountability for Executive Action 
Outside EU-territory”, European Papers, Vol. 2, 2017, No 2, pp. 571-596. 
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decision refusing entry. While it is specified that complaints against such decisions shall not 
have a suspensive effect, no precise indication is given as to whether the complaint must satisfy 
any conditions of fair trial and effective remedy. In addition, no specification is provided in 
relation to the independence of the authority competent to receive the complaint.62 At the 
same time, and with regard to the scope of the complaints allowed against a refusal of entry 
under the SBC, the CJEU has clarified that appeals against refusal of entry also include a right 
to challenge the way in which border checks are conducted.63 
The Court has confirmed that MS must provide appropriate legal remedies for infringement of 
fundamental rights when a situation falls within the scope of EU law.64 These situations include 
acts undertaken by border officials at the time of adoption of an entry decision, including when 
these acts are not directly related or relevant to the adoption of the entry decision. In fact, 
within the meaning of Article 6 of Regulation No 562/2006, border guards performing their 
duties, are required, inter alia, to fully respect human dignity. The Court has also specified that 
in cases of mistreatment suffered at the hand of national border guards, an effective remedy 
in the meaning of EU Charter Article 47 cannot be granted if complaints are only allowed before 
the same authority responsible for conducting checks at the EU borders, and when the decision 
undertaken by the latter with regard to the complaint is not subject to appeal. Therefore, it 
seems that an adequate level of protection can only be granted by allowing victims of 
mistreatments access to a court or an administrative body that, from an institutional and 
functional perspective, provides the same guarantees as a court.   
With regard to third country nationals who are refused entry and consequently become subject 
to a return decision or an entry ban pursuant to the Return Directive, EU law provides that an 
“effective remedy” must be allowed before a “competent judicial or administrative body 
composed of members who are impartial and who enjoy safeguards of independence”.65 
Further guarantees apply when a third country national, who is either refused entry at the EU 
border or who is not entitled to stay within the territory of a MS, is detained for the purpose of 
his/her return. This includes situations where immigration detention is a result of border 
controls conducted at an airport located within the territory of the MS refusing entry.66 In these 
cases, third country nationals have the right to be informed immediately about the possibility 
to engage proceedings by means of which the lawfulness of the detention can be subject to a 
prompt and speedy judicial review (article 15(2) of the Return Directive). 
 
                                                     
62 A similar provision is contained in the Visa Code. See article 32(2) Regulation (EC) No 810/2009 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 establishing a Community Code on Visas.  
63 CJEU, Zakaria, case C-23/12, 17.01.2013. 
64 Ibid., para. 40. 
65 Article 13 of the Return Directive.  
66 See FRA Report on Fundamental rights at airports: border checks at five international airports in the European 
Union, p. 29.  
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2. BODIES AND INSTITUTIONS RESPONSIBLE FOR RECEIVING, 
HANDLING AND ADDRESSING HUMAN RIGHTS COMPLAINTS 
Key findings 
 Human rights protection gaps emerge from the blurring of operational roles and mandates 
played by a multiplicity of different border and migration management professionals. 
While (co)-operating under different capacities in border management activities and 
joint expulsion operations, the law enforcement authorities and defence actors of CoE 
State Parties are often subject to different domestic human rights oversight mechanisms 
and related accountability regimes. 
 Structural and functional limitations affect the internal oversight bodies established within 
law enforcement or security apparatuses. In particular, the lack of independence that 
traditionally affects these oversight instruments also hampers their ability to investigate 
and redress complaints on human rights violations effectively. Therefore, these bodies 
cannot be qualified as ‘complaint mechanisms’. 
 Frontex: a substandard complaint mechanism. It is subject to specific challenges and 
limitations that undermine the effectiveness of internal oversight mechanisms when it 
comes to human rights abuses occurring during border control, border surveillance 
and/or expulsion-related tasks. The procedure established under Article 72 of the EBCG 
Frontex Regulation does not allow for an appropriate and effective monitoring and 
assessment of human rights violations and complaints received in the context of Frontex 
EBCG operations.  
 Ombudsman institutions and national human rights commissions and bodies offer an 
uneven supplementary administrative protection to judicial remedies. Intended to 
provide individuals with the possibility of submitting complaints for mistreatments and 
human rights abuses, the extent to which ombudspersons are able to conduct 
independent and thorough investigations, are accessible in practice, and are in a position 
to provide timely and effective remedies varies considerably across the 11 countries 
covered. 
 NHRIs meet all the UN Paris Principles in only 5 of the 11 countries under consideration. 
To comply with these principles, a NHRI must be fully independent from the government, 
it must function regularly and effectively, and have adequate powers of investigation 
and the capacity to hear complaints and transmit them to the competent authorities. 
NHRIs are also required to develop relations with non-governmental and international 
organisations devoted to promoting and protecting the human rights of particularly 
vulnerable groups, including migrants and refugees. 
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 Non-compliance with UN Paris Principles undermines the capacity of NHRIs to ensure the 
protection of human rights in line with standards provided under international human 
rights law and has negative repercussions linked inter alia with exclusion from UN human 
rights processes and procedures. 
    
1.2 Who does what in border control and expulsions? Multiple actors, different 
accountability regimes and protection gaps  
The legal standards developed under the ECHR and the EU Charter contribute respectively to 
clarifying the human rights responsibilities of security actors vis-à-vis individuals undergoing 
border checks, apprehended in a situation of irregularity in the context of border patrolling, or 
subjected to return procedures. However, a series of structural shortcomings and 
implementation gaps are still likely to undermine the effectiveness of the supranational human 
rights safeguards developed to protect individuals from abuses that might occur in the context 
of border control, border surveillance, and expulsion operations. 
Human rights accountability challenges emerge in the first place from the already multiple and 
increasing number of different authorities taking part in border control, border surveillance-
related and migration management activities, and the consequent complexity of the legal and 
institutional background against which the activities of these actors take place.  
The governance of border management and immigration control systems currently depends on 
the work and interactions of many formal (military, police, gendarmerie, intelligence, border 
guards) and informal (private actors, international organisations) security actors. In each of the 
11 CoE State Parties considered, a wide range of security professionals is involved in border 
control, border surveillance, and expulsion-related functions.67 These national authorities and 
security actors contribute, to different extents and in diverse operational contexts, to border 
checks, the surveillance of land and sea borders, and expulsion operations.68  
A case in point is Greece, where border surveillance at sea mainly falls under the responsibility 
of the Hellenic Coast Guard, which has also law enforcement functions, but the latter is assisted 
by the Hellenic Navy. The institutional landscape is even more complex in Italy, where sea 
border patrols are carried out by five different authorities: the Border Police, Tax and Customs 
Police, Carabinieri, Coastguard, and the Navy. In some countries, executive functions related to 
border control, border surveillance or expulsions are performed by agents affiliated to one law 
enforcement agency acting under the control of different ministries. This is the case for 
                                                     
67 A comprehensive overview of the 11 countries’ authorities entrusted with executive powers and (directly or 
indirectly) involved in border management and expulsion-related tasks is provided in Annex 1 of this book. 
68 The picture becomes even more complex if we consider that, at the wider EU level, there are over 50 national 
authorities currently assigned with tasks related to the implementation of the Schengen acquis. See List of national 
services responsible for border-controls for the purposes of Article 15(2) of Regulation (EC) No 562/2006 of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 2006 establishing a Community Code on the rules governing 
the movement of persons across borders (Schengen Borders Code), 2006/C 247/02. 
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example of the Guardia Civil in Spain.69 As for expulsions procedures, their implementation not 
only relies on the coordination of different immigration and law enforcement authorities 
operating at the national and local level (e.g. Turkey), but also entails the involvement of 
support staff including officials of international organisations (e.g. IOM), private escorts and 
medical personnel.  
The actors mentioned above are not only entrusted with diverse operational tasks and 
corresponding executive powers, but also act under the authority and supervision of different 
institutional structures (e.g. national ministries, executive directors, line managers, etc.). From 
the perspective of third country nationals who might be victim of abuses, the multiplication of 
border and immigration management-related actors (and the blurring between 
professionalised border authorities with police and even military actors) translates into a 
difficulty in identifying clearly which bodies, institutions and mechanisms are responsible for 
overseeing their actions and activities.   
Ensuring human rights accountability of the various actors operating in the field of border 
management and returns is further complicated by the increasing participation of CoE State 
Parties in regional and international cooperation initiatives. Integrated border management 
systems are not only multi-actors and multi-agencies, the experience in the EU shows that they 
are also becoming increasingly transnational, as their functioning relies on cooperation 
between border and coast guards and other security players from a wide range of countries. 
The so-called EBCG (Frontex) joint operations provide an example of the way in which: i) various 
jurisdictions currently contribute to determining the legality of the actions of different national 
authorities involved in specific phases or aspects of border control, border surveillance or 
expulsion operations,70 and; ii) diverse accountability regimes (and related oversight 
mechanisms) apply to the actors involved in these activities. Different (administrative and 
criminal law) accountability regimes (and related oversight systems) apply to the border and 
coast guards that, on a case-by-case basis, participate in EBCG operational activities. The 
differentiation under this “shared accountability” system is exacerbated by the current EBCG 
Regulation, through the important extension that this piece of legislation added to the 
executive powers of guest officers deployed in host MS. 
Box 2. Different accountability regimes under the EBCG Regulation 
In the framework of EBCG Frontex joint operations, different EU MS authorities are pooled 
and deployed by their “home country” in other “hosting countries” along the EU’s external 
borders. The deployed members of EBCG teams have the capacity to “perform all task and 
exercise all powers for border control and return” (Article 40 of the EBCG Regulation).71 
Guest officers work under the command and control of the authorities of the hosting country, 
and the different agents composing the EBCG “operational teams” are responsible for acting 
                                                     
69 See Annex I of this book. 
70 Article 3(1) of the Frontex Code of Conduct expressly requires participants in Frontex operational activities to 
comply with international law, EU law and the national law of both home and host MS.  
71 Border guards deployed in other MS operational areas exercise the powers required to perform border checks, 
border surveillance (this includes interviewing undocumented persons, fingerprinting, consulting databases). 
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in line with the legal obligations provided in EU primary and secondary law provisions, as well 
as with the ethical and behavioural principles set forth in the Frontex Code of Conduct.72 
At the same time, it is up to the home MS authorities to exercise control over their deployed 
personnel.73 In practice, this means that the various agents deployed in a Frontex operational 
activity remain subject to the oversight mechanisms specifically applying to the national 
institution with which they are affiliated. This is also confirmed by Article 21(5) of the ECBG 
Regulation, which stresses that it is upon the home country to provide “appropriate 
disciplinary or other measures” which, in accordance with national law, should apply to 
violations of fundamental rights or international protection obligations committed by their 
border guards. Article 21(2) of the Frontex Code of Conduct further specifies that it is up to 
the “relevant authority of the Member State to use its powers regarding the necessary 
disciplinary measures and, if applicable, suspend or remove the person concerned from the 
respective pool for a defined period”.74 
 
Human rights protection issues might also arise from the blurring of the operational roles 
played by the variety of law enforcement authorities and security and defence actors that, 
while acting under different legal frameworks, institutional mandates, and operational 
capacities, directly or indirectly participate in border and/or immigration management-related 
activities.  
For example, different CoE countries have frigates or officers deployed in EBCG’s Frontex sea 
operations such as Triton, Poseidon Sea, Hera, Indalo, and Minerva. At the same time, CoE 
country navies also take part in Operation EUNAVFOR MED Sophia. The latter constitutes an 
EU Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) initiative, but it is also likely to entail the 
detection of traffickers and rescues at sea.75 At the same time, EU standards (see above 
paragraph 1.2) were specifically designed for MS professional border guards. This means the 
military of CoE countries that do not participate in the implementation of the Schengen acquis 
remain exempt from its legal obligations, behavioural standards and scrutiny systems.76 
Similar challenges also arise from the ever-prominent operational involvement of authorities 
from third (non-CoE and non-EU) countries in border control and border surveillance activities 
                                                     
72 The Code of Conduct applies to all Frontex operational activities, including those which take place outside the 
territory of the Union and, to all persons participating in them (Article 1). 
73 For example, in the Frontex Joint Operation EPN Hera, national officials responsible for maritime and aerial 
assets deployed at sea acted under the ‘command and control’ of their respective home MS. See Frontex 
Operational Plan Joint Operation EPN Hera 2014, 2014/SBS/03. 
74 Article 21(2) further stresses that “Only if the continued engagement of this person jeopardises the Frontex 
operational activity in question, the Executive Director may decide to suspend or remove him or her from that 
activity”. 
75 For an update of recent developments in this respect, see Secretary-General of the European Commission, 
Second report on the implementation of the EU Maritime Security Strategy Action Plan, Joint Staff Working 
Document, SWD(2016) 238 final, Brussels, 15.06.2017, p. 32. 
76 See FRA (2013), Fundamental rights at Europe’s Southern Sea Borders, p. 37. 
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directed at preventing irregular border crossings of migrants and asylum seekers, as well as in 
conducting expulsion operations.77 The exact role and actual responsibilities of foreign 
authorities acting de facto as EU external border agents remain to a large extent unclear. This 
is also due to the fact that their missions are often covered by “soft law” instruments, such as 
Council Decisions, declarations, working agreements, memoranda of understanding and 
technical arrangements which substantially escape both democratic and judicial scrutiny.78 At 
the same time, partial references in EU legislative texts – such as the EBCG Regulation – cannot 
address the problems related to the identification of the authority responsible for receiving 
complaints about fundamental rights violations committed by third countries authorities, nor 
solve the issue related to the uncertainty in the accountability regimes applicable to the 
different actors involved in border management and expulsion operations.79 
2.2 Existing oversight systems responsible for receiving human rights complaints   
The determination of responsibility for actions or omissions committed by police services and 
other publicly authorised and/or controlled bodies responsible for “maintaining law and order 
in civil society” requires the establishment of dedicated oversight systems and complaint 
mechanisms. The analysis conducted in the previous sections of this book clarified how 
accountability should be ensured in all situations where CoE State Parties’ law enforcement 
actors enjoy discretion in the use of force vis-à-vis individuals, regardless of the specific 
operational contexts (e.g. international borders, or in the context of return flights) when such 
discretion is exercised. This is further confirmed by the explanatory memorandum annexed to 
the European Code of Police Ethics.80 
At the same time, there are a multiplicity of accountability structures, operating at different 
levels of control. The Organisation for Security Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), for instance, has 
identified “five levels of supervision”, which include “internal affairs, external oversight, 
Parliamentary oversight, police/media policies and procedures, and local police/community 
relations”.81  However, it is not clear which mechanisms should apply to which element of the 
border management and immigration control systems, which constitutes a far-reaching gap. 
                                                     
77 As recently reinstated by Frontex, measures in third countries and cooperation with neighbours are considered 
as “essential components” of the so-called EU integrated border management approach, and complement EU 
external border control and other security measures within the EU areas of free movement. See Frontex Report 
to the European Parliament on Frontex cooperation with third countries in 2016. Since the adoption of the EBCG 
regulation, the agency can also carry out joint operations on the territory of third countries neighbouring at least 
one MS (Article 54 ECBG Regulation). 
78 See S. Carrera, L. Den Hertog and M. Stefan (2017), “It wasn’t me! The Luxembourg Court Orders on the EU-
Turkey Refugee Deal”, CEPS Policy Insight No 2017-15, April 2017. 
79 See S. Carrera, M. Stefan et al. (2018), “The Future of the Schengen Area: Latest Developments and Challenges 
in the Schengen Governance Framework since 2016”, Study for the European Parliament LIBE Committee, Policy 
Department for Citizens' Rights and Constitutional Affairs, p. 43. 
80 See Recommendation Rec(2001)10 adopted by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe on 19 
September 2001, and explanatory memorandum. 
81 See OSCE (2008), Guidebook on Democratic Policing, by the Senior Police Adviser to the OSCE Secretary General, 
Vienna, May 2008, 2nd Edition. 
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This section identifies the bodies and institutions currently responsible for receiving and 
handling complaints related to human rights violations in the context of border management 
activities and return operations. The analysis of the structural and functional features of these 
bodies and institutions is also required to clarify which, among these structures, qualify as an 
effective complaint mechanism in light of the human rights standards analysed in the previous 
section. 
2.1.2  Human rights accountability and the role of internal complaint mechanisms  
When it comes to the accountability of law enforcement authorities and the wide range of 
security actors, a first level of control is exercised by the internal oversight bodies created 
within the organisation performing border control, border surveillance and/or expulsion 
operations, and responsible for following up cases of abuses and violations of fundamental 
rights committed by their agents. In the 11 countries covered by this book, mechanisms of this 
type are established, for instance, in Austria, where the Federal States’ Security Police 
Directorates are competent to receive complaints against abuses committed by the Austrian 
National Border Police in the context of border control and apprehension procedures.82  
However, among the CoE countries analysed in this book, there are other examples of internal 
oversight systems and ‘complaint mechanisms’ established within law enforcement 
organisations responsible for border control, border surveillance, and expulsion operations. 
These include, for instance, the audit body established within the Hellenic Police, as well as the 
Unit for Complaints, Applications and Administrative Control Department established at the 
Polish Border Guard headquarters, and the Section of Control and Inspection Service of the 
Ministry of the Interior of the Slovak Republic. 
In the field of Security Sector Reform (SSR), it is often argued that internal oversight 
mechanisms constitute an integral part of the “conglomerate of processes” through which 
security actors can be held accountable for the fundamental rights violations for which they are 
responsible.83 Internal accountability relies in particular on an “internal chain of command” that 
includes both a systematic reporting system and a functioning disciplinary system. By allowing 
colleagues to report abuses, and affected individuals to lodge complaints with oversight bodies 
or supervisors within the force, these internal mechanisms can contribute to monitoring and 
improving human rights standards in the implementation of the executive powers of these 
agencies.84 At the same time, there are a number of limitations that affect the capacity of 
internal oversight systems to ensure accountability of law enforcement and security actors 
                                                     
82 According to the Austrian expert respondent of the e-survey developed for this book, there are no other 
authorities responsible for receiving such complaints except when: i) the complaint is against a decision 
undertaken in the framework of return operations and concerning asylum seekers (for which the BFA is 
competent); or ii) the complainant qualifies as eligible to contact the Ombudsperson for a possibility of 
supervision.  
83 See United Nation Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), Handbook on Police Accountability, Oversight and 
Integrity, Criminal Justice Handbook Series, United Nations Publications, Vienna, 2011, p. 12.  
84 Ibid, p. 75-76.  
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responsible for human rights violations committed in the context of border control, border 
surveillance or expulsion operations. 
In the first place, the capacity to thoroughly assess responsibilities is lacking when complaints 
are exclusively handled by internal oversight bodies or the line of command from the same 
executive authority to which the agent implicated in a case of alleged of human rights violation 
is affiliated.85 As “internal discipline, hierarchy, as well as the collegial loyalty” constitute typical 
features of law enforcement and security organisations,86 the integrity and accountability of 
agents within police and defence forces cannot depend solely on internal oversight systems 
and complaint mechanisms. If the above observation applies to the so-called security sector in 
general, specific challenges and limitations further undermine the effectiveness of internal 
complaint mechanisms when it comes to human rights abuses that might occur during the 
performance of border control, border surveillance and/or expulsion-related tasks. 
In fact, these activities are often implemented in widely dispersed and ‘out-of-sight’ locations 
and operative contexts (e.g. border surveillance operations at sea). Also, operators from the 
private sector (e.g. escorts and medical staff involved in forced return flights) as well as 
community-based militias (e.g. the so-called ‘border hunters’ in Hungary) have been 
progressively co-opted into border-management and policing work. These elements further 
hamper the role and potential of traditional internal police accountability mechanisms in 
preventing abuses and redressing complaints concerning human rights violations that might 
occur at the hand of the different actors involved in border control, border surveillance or 
returns operations. 
2.2.2 The Frontex complaint mechanism 
The manifold limitations that affect the capacity of internal oversight systems to effectively 
handle complaints related to human rights violations committed in the contexts of border and 
expulsion procedures emerge when analysing the mechanism established under Article 72 of 
the EBCG Regulation.  
As an EU agency, Frontex is under the obligation to perform its tasks in line with the standards 
set forth in the EU Charter, and is therefore required to ensure the protection of the 
fundamental rights (e.g. physical integrity and dignity, asylum and international 
protection, non-refoulement, effective remedy and the protection of personal data) that might 
be put at risk during the implementation of its activities. The obligation to respect the human 
rights standards enshrined in EU primary and secondary legislation currently applies to all the 
different EU and non-EU authorities participating in EBCG operations. 
                                                     
85 See, for instance, Council of Europe, Commissioner for Human Rights. Opinion of the Commissioner for Human 
Rights concerning independent and effective determination of complaints against the police. CommDH(2009)4. 
Strasbourg: Council of Europe, 12 March 2009. 
86 See M. den Boer and R. Fernhout (2008), “Policing the Police, Police Oversight Mechanisms in Europe: Towards 
a Comparative Overview of Ombudsmen and Their Competencies”, Background Report Presented at the workshop 
“Improving the Role of the Police in Asia and Europe”, Delhi, India, 3-4 December 2008. 
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Since the establishment of the agency, important improvements have been made to ensure 
compliance with existing EU and international human rights standards applying to Frontex 
activities. In particular, the adoption of the agency’s Fundamental Rights Strategy87 and the 
Codes of Conduct,88 the appointment of the Fundamental Rights Officer (FRO)89 and the setup 
of the Frontex Consultative Forum90 contribute to adding value to the agency’s role in ensuring 
that human rights safeguards are duly taken into account in the implementation of EU border 
control, border surveillance and returns procedures. 
Most recently, Regulation 2016/1624/EU has not only expanded the operational mandate of 
the agency,91 but also incorporated new safeguards in response to the preoccupations 
expressed by EU bodies including the European Ombudsman92 and institutions including the 
European Parliament93 with regard to the human rights obligations of the actors participating 
in the activities of Frontex. Article 72 of Regulation EU/1624/2016, in particular, established a 
mechanism designed to allow migrants and asylum seekers the possibility to lodge individual 
complaints about fundamental rights violations committed by staff involved in Frontex 
activities.94 
The accountability challenges that, before the entry into force of the EBCG Regulation, arose 
from the lack of a mechanism to deal with complaints on fundamental rights infringements 
have been pointed out widely.95 As Box 3 describes, it was in particular the European 
Ombudsman that highlighted the lack of an up-to-standards complaint mechanism as one of 
the main shortcomings affecting the overall accountability regime at Frontex from the 
perspective of the right of good administration. 
 
                                                     
87 Frontex (2011), Frontex Fundamental Rights Strategy, Endorsed by the Frontex Management Board on 31 March 
2011.  
88 Article 35 EBCG Regulation.  
89 Article 70 EBCG Regulation. 
90 Article 71 EBCG Regulation.  
91 S. Carrera, S. Blockmans, J.P. Cassarino, D. Gros and E. Guild (2016), “The European Border and Coast Guard 
Addressing migration and asylum challenges in the Mediterranean?”, CEPS Task Force Report, CEPS, Brussels. 
92 See the Decision of the European Ombudsman closing own-initiative inquiry OI/5/2012/BEH-MHZ concerning 
the European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member 
States of the European Union (Frontex), 12 November 2013. 
93 See European Parliament resolution of 2 December 2015 on the Special Report of the European Ombudsman in 
own-initiative inquiry OI/5/2012/BEH-MHZ concerning Frontex (2014/2215(INI)). 
94 According to Article 2(b) of the Frontex Code of conduct, this includes “... any activity coordinated or led by 
Frontex within the framework of its tasks as described in the Frontex Regulation”. According to the EBCG 
regulation, these activities encompass: Joint Operations, Pilot Projects, Joint Return Operations, Rapid Border 
Interventions, the deployment of Migration Management Support Team, but also Return Operations, Return 
Interventions, and Trainings. 
95 See, for instance, M. Fink (2016), “A “Blind Spot” in the Framework of International Responsibility? Third Party 
Responsibility for Human Rights Violations: The Case of Frontex”, in T. Gammeltoft-Hansen and J. Vedsted-Hansen 
(eds), Human Rights and the Dark Side of Globalisation: Transnational Law Enforcement. 
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Box 3. Frontex complaint mechanism in light of the European Ombudsman’s own inquiry  
In its own-initiative inquiry concerning Frontex,96 the European Ombudsman stressed the 
necessity of setting up a procedure for individuals to claim a breach of their fundamental 
rights directly. The Ombudsman clarified that such a complaint mechanism was needed to 
complement the system of incident reporting from Frontex staff and guest officers, and 
integrate the overall set of “in-house instruments” that the Fundamental Rights Strategy and 
the Codes of Conduct put in place to monitor compliance with human rights standards 
applying to Frontex activities.97 The Ombudsman clarified that reporting and complaint 
mechanisms are not alternatives, but mutually reinforce each other in guaranteeing the 
effective protection of fundamental rights.98 
In stressing the need for a “genuine complaint mechanism”, the European Ombudsman 
highlighted the importance of establishing transparent procedures to be followed by those 
responsible for assessing human rights abuses allegations in a way that avoids “large margins 
of discretion”.99 It was also recommended that the complaint mechanism be open to all 
persons concerned, and namely: all those obliged to report human rights violations under EU 
or national rules; individuals directly affected by infringements; as well as those who become 
aware of them, including journalists, NGOs, etc.100 In the view of the Ombudsman, allowing 
the submission of so-called “public interest complaints” would have aided the agency – and, 
in particular, the FRO – in its duty to consider infringements of fundamental rights in all 
Frontex activities. 
 
The need to set up a procedure for handling individual human rights complaints was reiterated 
by the European Parliament.101 It is reasonable to consider that, with the introduction of Article 
72 in the current EBCG Regulation, the EU co-legislator intended to fill the gaps that the 
absence of any complaint procedure left in the observance of fundamental rights obligations 
at Frontex. However, the way in which this mechanism is currently designed is profoundly 
different from the one indicated (and recommended) by the European Ombudsman in its 
assessment. 
                                                     
96See Decision of the European Ombudsman closing own-initiative inquiry OI/5/2012/BEH-MHZ concerning the 
European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States 
of the European Union (Frontex), 12.11.2013.  
97 These instruments include the Consultative Forum, the FRO, the coordinating officer, and the mechanism for 
suspending and terminating joint operations and pilot projects with the Executive Director making the final 
decision.  
98 Point 79 of the Ombudsman's assessment. 
99 Point 78 of the Ombudsman's assessment. 
100 Point 81 of the Ombudsman's assessment. 
101 European Parliament resolution of 2 December 2015 on the Special Report of the European Ombudsman in 
own-initiative inquiry OI/5/2012/BEH-MHZ concerning Frontex (2014/2215(INI)). 
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Firstly, only individual complaints are allowed under the current procedures.102 This contradicts 
the recommendation to make the Frontex complaint mechanism available to all stakeholders 
with a legitimate interest to activate a procedure directed at assessing responsibilities for 
human rights violations. Furthermore, in order to be considered admissible, complaints cannot 
be lodged anonymously.103 The choice of making anonymous complaints inadmissible by law 
can be explained in light of the objective of avoiding abuses of the procedure. However, this 
might hamper the objective of encouraging possible victims of human rights violations to 
activate the procedures.104 The requirement to submit complaints in writing105 also constitutes 
a limitation, as it prevent the possibility of victims activating the complaint procedure directly 
when the fundamental right abuse actually takes place. It is striking to note that while cases of 
human rights violations involving border and coast guards participating in Frontex activities are 
constantly recorded through the Frontex Serious Incident reporting system,106 only 2 
complaints were received by the agency in 2016, and 13 in 2017.107  
Secondly, the complaint procedure largely relies on the discretionary power of internal 
oversight bodies. While the responsibility for handling different phases/aspects of the 
complaints received by the agency is entrusted to the FRO, doubts persists as to the real 
capacity of this body to act independently, and in ways that might not always be in the agency’s 
direct interest. The FRO remains an ordinary Frontex employee required to report to the 
Frontex Management Board108 and, in the framework of the procedure established under 
Article 72 of the EBCG Regulation, to the Executive Director of the agency. The lack of 
independence in the Frontex complaint procedure is especially evident when it comes to 
fundamental right allegations concerning a staff member of the agency. When considered 
admissible by the FRO, these complaints are then subjected to the scrutiny of the Executive 
Director,109 who has the power to conduct appropriate investigations, ensure follow up and 
take decisions – with no guarantee of impartiality or transparency.  
This short-coming becomes most significant when considering the limitations in the current 
EBCG when ensuring the suspension of a Frontex operation following provision by the 
Consultative Forum of sufficient evidence about fundamental human rights violations in 
specific MS border control, surveillance and expulsion activities: handling is currently left 
exclusively in the hands of the Frontex Executive Director (Article 25.2 of the Regulation). 
Similar challenges also emerge when human rights complaints received by Frontex concern the 
                                                     
102 Article 3 of the Agency’s Rules on the Complaint Mechanism. 
103 Article 5(2) of the Agency’s Rules on the Complaint Mechanism. 
104 As confirmed by the information collected through the survey conducted in the framework of this book, 
anonymity was indicated among the main reasons for declaring complaint inadmissible. 
105 Article 5(1) of the Agency’s Rules on the Complaint Mechanism. 
106 As of 31.07.2017, the agency received 561 serious incident reports. See Frontex response to Request for access 
to Documents. (www.asktheeu.org/en/request/reports_of_violation_of_frontex#incoming-14459).   
107 Figures provided by the FRO during interviews conducted in the framework of this book. 
108 Article 71(2) EBCG Regulation. 
109 Article 72(5) EBCG Regulation.  
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members of national teams participating in the agency’s operational activities. In these cases, 
admissible complaints are forwarded by the FRO to “home Member State” of the national 
border or coast guard against whom complaints are brought.110 For such matters, the FRO has 
asked MS to identify their respective contact points at the law enforcement authorities from 
which national agents can be pooled by Frontex, as well as the MS body that is “competent for 
fundamental rights”.  
However, there is a general lack of clarity regarding the institutions that, at the national or local 
level and on a case-by-case basis, are required and competent to conduct investigations and 
provide remedies. The extent to which national human rights institutions are actually involved 
in the assessment of the complaints is particularly unclear. The EBCG Regulation only requires 
the FRO to “inform” these authorities of the ongoing procedure. Furthermore, human rights 
institutions that are competent to receive and follow up complaints related to violations of 
human rights of aliens occurring in the context of border control, border surveillance and 
expulsion operations do not always exist at the national level.111  
Thirdly, despite the fact that the FRO is responsible for monitoring the final decision and the 
“appropriate follow-up” by the Executive Director or the MS, the Regulation fails to specify the 
nature of an “appropriate follow-up”. In this respect, the Regulation does not provide 
clarifications as to the concrete actions or measures that the FRO can undertake, for instance, 
to prompt and “ensure” thorough investigations into the complaints by the agency or the 
national authorities concerned.  
Given the uncertain and ultimately limited power of the FRO, it is reasonable to conclude that 
the practical relevance of the Frontex complaints mechanism (i.e. its capacity to identify 
responsibility and provide for remedies) essentially depends on the willingness of the agency’s 
Executive Director or that of the national authorities concerned.112 The actual role and function 
played by the Frontex complaint mechanism is clearly limited by the fact that this procedure 
only covers cases of human rights infringements committed by authorities performing border 
control, border surveillance or expulsion-related tasks in the framework of the agency’s activity. 
However, EU MS conduct parallel border surveillance activities which, while still falling within 
the scope of the SBC and subject to the EU Charter, take place outside the remit of Frontex 
operations.  
Moreover, this is particularly problematic when MS authorities performing maritime 
surveillance are defence or military authorities. A case in point is provided by the Common 
Defence and Security Policy (CDSP) (EUNAVFOR MED) Operation Sophia. While the military 
actors participating in this operation are mostly mandated to fight against smugglers, they may 
                                                     
110 Article 72(7) EBCG Regulation. 
111 This is the case of Italy, for instance. See Annex 2 of this book. 
112 See, for example, Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, “Frontex: human rights responsibilities”, 
Report of 8 April 2013, Doc. 13161. 
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well conduct search and rescue operations at sea during their deployment.113 It is important to 
note here that they are not subject to the same fundamental rights standards, codes of 
conduct, and oversight mechanisms that apply when these activities are performed by 
authorities participating in implementation of the EBCG Regulation. Victims of fundamental 
rights violations occurring at the hands of the authorities involved in Operation Sophia are not 
allowed to seek the same remedies that would be available against abuses committed in the 
framework of an EBCG operational activity.114 
2.3.2 The role of national human rights institutions and bodies  
Legally binding provisions contained in regional human rights instruments (ECHR and CPT), EU 
primary law (the EU Charter) and secondary legislation (including the SBC and the Return 
Directive), as well as provisions in documents that are not legally binding, offer clear and 
authoritative indications as to the features and functions that instruments of redress must 
possess in order to qualify as ‘complaint mechanisms’ and effectively contribute to keeping law 
enforcement authorities accountable in respect of human rights obligations. These features 
also help delineate the differences that exist between complaint mechanisms and: i) the 
internal oversight systems analysed in the previous paragraph; or ii) other instruments and 
bodies that participate in the protection of third county nationals from risks of human rights 
violations in the context of border control and expulsion procedures. 
Complaints bodies cannot substitute for other criminal and/or judicial remedies. If complaints 
mechanisms are intended to provide individuals (and in some cases organisations) with the 
possibility of accessing and activating procedures before an authority responsible for following 
up allegations of mistreatments and human rights abuses, their role is to offer a form of 
administrative protection which is supplementary to the judicial remedies that must still be 
made available at the domestic and supranational level.115 For example, if judicial remedies are 
required to obtain protection in the meaning of Article 47 of the EU Charter, the right to good 
administration enshrined in Article 41 should be respected through the right of individuals to 
lodge complaints with other bodies of administrative and/or quasi-judicial nature. 
In many European Countries, these bodies are represented by Ombudspersons and NHRIs 
operating at the national or sub-national levels of government, which are responsible for 
handling cases of mistreatment or unlawful behaviour from public authorities, and often act on 
grounds that also cover violations of rights, including human rights.116 Out of the 11 countries 
                                                     
113 See G. Bevilacqua (2017), “Exploring the Ambiguity of Operation Sophia Between Military and Search and 
Rescue Activities”, in G. Andreone, The Future of the Law of the Sea: Bridging Gaps Between National, Individual 
and Common Interests, Springer Open. 
114 Article 274 of TFEU provides: “Save where jurisdiction is conferred on the Court of Justice of the European 
Union by the Treaties, disputes to which the Union is a party shall not on that ground be excluded from the 
jurisdiction of the courts or tribunals of the Member States”. 
115 United National General Assembly, Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons under Any Form of 
Detention or Imprisonment, A/RES/43/173, 76th plenary meeting, 9 December 1988. See Principle 33, para 4. 
116 See C.L. Reif (2004), The Ombudsman, Good Governance and the International Human Rights System, Martinus 
Nijhoff, 2004. 
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covered by this book, all but Italy have established institutions before which complaints can be 
lodged by third country nationals alleging a violation of their fundamental rights in the context 
of border controls and surveillance, or expulsion operations.  
An overview of these bodies and their mandate to receive and handle complaints concerning 
human rights violations suffered during border control procedures, border surveillance 
activities, or during returns, is provided in Annex 2 of this book. The overview shows that the 
majority of ombudsmen established in the 11 CoE State Parties under consideration is formally 
and generally entitled to receive and address complaints related to fundamental rights 
infringements committed by public authorities in the context of border control, border 
surveillance, and expulsion operations. However, the exact role played by each of these 
institutions varies significantly from country to country. 
A number of different factors contribute to shaping the conditions and the extent to which 
Ombudspersons are able to conduct independent and thorough investigations, but also 
accessible in practice, and are entitled to provide a timely and effective response to 
complainants presenting a human rights violation in line with the previously examined regional 
and international standards. It is the normative framework and distribution of competences 
among different authorities responsible for overseeing border control, border surveillance or 
expulsion operations and for handling complaints and providing remedies at the local and 
national level that determine the specific competences, ways of working, and powers of the 
ombudsperson in dealing with human rights abuses. In this respect, the 11 countries 
considered in this book adopt a variety of different ‘models’, which are by and large context-
specific. 
In Italy, for instance, an independent national human rights institution does not exist, and a 
national ombudsperson for the people deprived of their personal freedom was only established 
in 2013.117 Acting as a National Preventive Mechanism (NPM) under the Optional Protocol to 
the UN Convention Against Torture (CAT),118 the National Guarantor has since 2016 the power 
to visit any place of detention, including detention centres and police premises at the border, 
but it is not vested with the power to receive and investigate individual complaints. In other 
countries, in contrast, the Ombudsman functions both as a complaint mechanism and human 
rights monitor in its capacity as a NPM. This is the case, for example, of Austria, Bulgaria, 
Greece, and Hungary, where the ombudsman overviews the implementation of the CAT, but is 
also entitled to receive and investigate complaints, and in some cases can recommend or 
prescribe different forms of reparations (e.g. the release of third county nationals when it is 
found that their detention is arbitrary or unlawful; or the payment of compensation) in case of 
abuse.  
                                                     
117 This body has been established by law no. 10 of 10.02.2014. 
118 The Optional Protocol to the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment (the Optional Protocol - OPCAT) provides for the establishment of National Preventive Mechanisms 
(NPMs) to monitor State Parties implementation of the CAT. The OPCAT also gives guidance concerning the NPMs 
mandate and powers. The most relevant of these provisions are Article 3, 4, 17-23, 29 and 35. 
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If certain conditions are met, the attribution of these two functions (i.e. monitoring and 
handling of complaints) to the same human rights institution can significantly enhance its role 
in contesting the impunity of those responsible for human rights violations. Affected individuals 
might be allowed to activate a human rights complaint procedure directly during the visit of an 
Ombudsman mission to the locality. The latter, might also be better positioned to start ex officio 
its own investigations to assess responsibilities for infringements of human rights standards 
observed in places where forced return operations are implemented. 
At the same time, protection gaps arise from the fact that the oversight tasks performed by 
different national human rights bodies in their capacity as NPMs are by definition limited to 
abuses perpetrated in the framework of immigration detention, and therefore can only 
effectively cover human rights violations occurring in the scope of expulsion operations. Thus, 
this limited monitoring mandate excludes the possibility for the institution to be effective in 
overviewing, preventing and redressing human rights violations that might occur in the context 
of border control or surveillance activities. 
Furthermore, accountability issues related to the combination of monitoring and complaint 
mechanism functions can arise when the responsible institution is not fully independent from 
the executive, and therefore cannot guarantee an adequate level of impartiality vis-à-vis the 
law enforcement authorities being monitored and the human rights allegations made against 
them. In a comparative analysis, the ways in which a complaint can be brought before this body 
and whether the latter can independently start its own investigation often depend on the 
specific legal frameworks adopted in different national systems. In this respect, the 11 CoE 
State Parties considered in the framework of this book present significant variations. 
In Hungary, a complaint (petition) before the ombudsman can be lodged only if the 
complainant has exhausted the available administrative legal remedies (excluding the judicial 
review of an administrative decision), or if no legal remedy is available to the complainant. 
Furthermore, the complaint cannot be processed if more than a year passed since the 
notification of the final administrative decision, or in cases where the identity of the 
complainant has not been revealed by him/herself. In Austria, complaints against human rights 
abuses committed in the framework of procedures related to denial of entry and apprehension 
(up to 14 days) have to be filed before the Security Police Directorates in the Federal States. On 
the other hand, the Austrian Ombudsman Board cannot handle complaints regarding cases 
which involve a procedure that has not yet been concluded, unless they relate, for example, to 
the duration of the proceedings, errors with deliveries, refusal to provide information or gross 
discourtesy on the part of officials.  
In Bulgaria, the Ombudsman has a duty to report fundamental rights violations (e.g. abuse of 
force, ill-treatment, etc.) witnessed in the context of border control, border surveillance and 
return operations before the Ministry of Interior of the Republic of Bulgaria. However, the 
office of the Ombudsman does not seem to be under a procedural duty to conduct official 
investigations entailing the gathering of adequate evidence for the assessment of the facts of 
the case and the identification of those responsible. In Greece, investigations against human 
rights violations occurring in the context of border management or forced removals can be 
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activated ex officio, but this decision remains discretionary and ultimately depends upon the 
Greek Ombudsman.   
Overall, it is concerning to note that while the ombudsman institutions (along with national 
human rights commissions and institutes) of the 11 countries covered in this book are 
progressively entrusted with an explicit human rights protection mandate in their  legal 
framework,119 only in 5 cases (namely Greece, Hungary, Poland Serbia, Spain) do they actually 
comply with all the UN Paris Principles.120 These principles constitute a set of core minimum 
criteria clarifying the status and model of functioning of national institutions for the protection 
and promotion of human rights, and their fulfilment is assessed on a case-by-case basis by the 
Global Alliance of National Human Rights Institutions (GANHRI).121 
A key feature for a NHRI to be compliant with the UN Paris Principles is its independence from 
the government. Also, the body or institution must be characterised by regular and effective 
functioning and have adequate powers of investigation, and the capacity to hear complaints 
and transmit them to the competent authorities. In terms of methods of operation, it is also 
required that, in their work, national institutions develop relations with the non-governmental 
organisations devoted to promoting and protecting human right of particularly vulnerable 
groups (including migrant workers, and refugees). Compliance with the Paris Principles is also 
assessed on the basis of a NHRI’s role in national contexts where democratic protections in the 
country are under threat, and in light of their actual contribution to protect and promote the 
human rights of all persons, especially those most affected by state’s conduct. In the 2014 to 
2015 period, for instance, both Albania’s People’s Advocate and Serbia’s Protector of Citizens 
were praised for their effectiveness “despite the challenging political environment” in which 
they operate.122 
While GANHRI is not explicit on which issues, or how many problems underlie the specific 
ranking (under A or B category) of a specific NHRI, the fact that NHRIs in Austria, Bulgaria and 
Slovakia do not currently qualify for an A-Status in the GANHRI accreditation chart 
automatically indicates the weaknesses of these institutions in terms of compliance with the 
Paris Principles. In the cases of the human rights bodies established in Italy, Romania, and 
Turkey, their exclusion from the GANHRI accreditation chart appears to arise from the fact that 
their structure, mandate, powers, and/or relation with the executive does not allow them to 
be qualified as NHRIs. On the other hand, Greece’s Ombudsman and Slovakia’s Public Defender 
                                                     
119 To date, EU member states with NHRIs include: Austria, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, 
Estonia, Finland, France, Greece, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, 
Slovenia, Spain and Sweden.    
120 See United Nations General Assembly, Principles Relating to the Status of National Institutions (Paris Principles), 
UN GA Res 48/134, UN Doc A/RES/48/134 (1993). 
121 See Article 5, and Section 5 of the GANHRI Statute [version adopted on 7 March 2017]. 
122 See, respectively: ICC/GANHRI, Report and Recommendations of the Session of the Sub-Committee on 
Accreditation (SCA) (Geneva: October 27-31, 2014) [ICC/GANHRI October 2014 Accreditation Recommendations] 
(Ukraine (A), Hungary (A), Russia (A), Albania (A), Finland (A)), and; ICC/GANHRI, Report and Recommendations of  
the Session of the Sub-Committee on Accreditation (SCA) (Geneva: March 16-20, 2015) [ICC/GANHRI March 2015 
Accreditation Recommendations] (Ecuador (A), Serbia (A), Uruguay (deferred), Latvia (A). 
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cannot currently obtain an accreditation due to the earlier accreditation of another country’s 
human rights commission or other national institution.123 
While the Paris Principles are non-binding, a wide consensus exists among the international 
human rights community – comprising states, international organisations and civil society 
actors – that only NHRIs in full compliance with the UN Paris Principles should be entrusted by 
states in protecting and promoting human rights at the domestic level.124 Regional 
organisations including the Council of Europe125 as well as the European Union Agency for 
Fundamental Rights (FRA) have also adopted full compliance with the Paris Principles as the 
standard for evaluating human rights institutions as being effective.  
Beside the reputational consequences associated with the failure to meet the Paris Principles, 
the exclusion of a NHRI from the list of A-rated institutions has negative repercussions linked 
with the consequent exclusion from UN human rights processes and procedures. In fact, one 
of the essential requirements of the Paris Principle is the interaction of NHRIs with the 
international human rights system, as NHRIs are required to assist, facilitate and participate in 
country visits by United Nations experts, “including special procedures mandate holders, treaty 
bodies, fact finding missions and commissions of inquiry”.126 They are also expected to 
contribute to “monitoring and promoting the implementation of relevant recommendations 
originating from the human rights system”.127 Thus, full compliance of NHRIs with the Paris 
Principles is also essential in order to ensure the protection of human rights through the 
implementation of the protection system established under relevant international human 
rights treaties.  
                                                     
123 In fact, in its General Observation 6.6, GANHRI “acknowledges and encourages the trend towards a strong 
national human rights protection system in a State by having one consolidated and comprehensive national human 
rights institution.” See Report and Recommendations of the Session of the Sub-Committee on Accreditation 
(Geneva: November 18-22, 2013), Annex III [GANHRI GOs]. 
124 See L. Reif (2016), “Human Rights Ombudsman Institutions as GANHRI Accredited National Human Rights 
Institutions (NHRIs): Benefits, Challenges and Limitations”, Paper presented at the 11th World Conference of the 
International Ombudsman Institute, Breakout Session II: Human rights based approach to the Ombudsman’s work 
- part 1, p. 95.  
125 See COE Parliamentary Assembly Res 1959, “Strengthening the institution of ombudsman in Europe” (2013) art 
4.5 (Assembly calls on COE member states with ombudsman institutions to consider seeking their accreditation at 
the ICC [now GANHRI] in light of the Paris Principles). 
126 GANHI General Observation no 1.4 “Interaction with the international human rights system”. 
127 Ibid. 
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2.4.2 Complaint mechanisms and International Human Rights Treaty Bodies 
Currently, there are 8 UN treaty bodies (ICCPR,128 CESCR,129 CAT,130 CERD,131 CEDAW,132 
CRPD,133 CED,134 and CRC135) which may, under certain conditions, consider complaints (or 
communications) from individuals alleging violations of a right protected by a specific 
convention. The individual complaint mechanism for the Committee on Migrant Workers 
(CMW) has been provided for in the covenant of reference, but it has not yet entered into force 
– since the minimum number of required declarations (i.e. 10) have not yet been made by the 
convention’s signatory parties. 
Under the UN human rights system individual complaints are optional. This means that in order 
for an individual complaint to be raised against a state party, the latter has to recognise the 
treaty body’s competence to receive the complaints. This happens by the mean of ratifying an 
additional protocol (in the case of ICCPR, CEDAW, CRPD, ICESCR and CRC), or through the 
submission of a declaration to the treaty (in the case of CERD, CAT, CED and CMW). The table 
below identifies the CoE State Parties considered in the framework of this book that currently 
recognise the competence of UN treaty bodies to receive individual complaints.  
Competence of UN treaty bodies to receive individual complaints (overview based on 
acceptance by CoE State Parties) 
 Study Countries 
Austria  Bulgaria Greece Hungary Italy Poland Romania Serbia Slovakia Spain  Turkey 
CCPR ✔ ✘ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 
 CESCR -- -- -- -- ✔ -- -- -- ✔ ✔ -- 
 CAT -- -- ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ -- ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 
CERD -- ✔ -- ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔136 ✔ ✔ ✔ -- 
CEDAW ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 
CRPD ✔ ✘ ✔ ✔ ✔ -- ✘ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 
 CRC ✘ -- -- -- ✔ ✘ ✘ ✘ ✔ ✔ ✘ 
CED ✔ -- -- -- -- -- -- ✔ ✔ ✔ -- 
 
Despite featuring some procedural variations, the different complaint mechanisms operate in 
a largely similar way. A series of preliminary requirements must be met in order for the 
                                                     
128 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 
129 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. 
130 Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. 
131 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination. 
132 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women. 
133 Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. 
134 International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance. 
135 Convention on the Rights of the Child. 
136 Romania considers that declaration does not confer to the Committee on the Elimination of Racial 
Discrimination the competence of examining complaints invoking infringements of collective rights. The national 
body competent to receive and to examine complaints in accordance with article 14 paragraph 2 of the ICERD is 
the National Council for Combating Discrimination established by the Government Decision no. 1194 of 2001. 
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individual complaint to be registered by the competent UN human rights body as a case for 
consideration.  
First, before making a complaint to a treaty body, individuals must first exhaust domestic 
remedies. This means that the complaint has first to be taken before the local courts and 
authorities and up to the highest available instance in the State party against which the 
complaint is directed. However, the committee may decide to derogate this general 
admissibility requirement when the claimant can prove that proceedings at the national level 
have been unreasonably prolonged, or remedies are unavailable or appear plainly ineffective. 
In most cases, the possibility of having a complaint considered by a UN treaty body is also 
conditional on the exclusion of the activation of other relevant remedies “on the same matter” 
provided under other existing international and supranational legal frameworks (such as the 
ECHR) to which the concerned country is party. For example, in order for the CCPR to consider 
any complaint from an individual regarding alleged violations of his/her rights, countries such 
as Austria, Italy, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Spain and Turkey require that the same matter does 
not constitute or has not previously constituted the object of an examination under another 
procedure of international investigation or settlement.137 The admissibility of the complaint is 
decided upon the satisfaction of the requirements indicated above, but the complainant must 
also: 
Prove that he/she is individually affected by a law, policy, practice, act or omission of the state 
party against which the complaint is lodged; 
Prove that the claim concerns a right protected by the treaty for implementation of which the 
committee is responsible; 
Prove that the claim does not require the committee to act as an appellate instance with 
respect to national courts and tribunals, as the UN treaty bodies cannot examine previous 
determinations of administrative, civil or criminal liability of individuals, nor can they review the 
question of innocence or guilt. 
At any stage before the case is considered, some Committees (e.g. CAT) may issue a request to 
the State party for “interim measures” in order to prevent any irreparable harm (such as, for 
example, the deportation of an individual facing a risk of torture) that the alleged victim could 
face while the complaint is being decided.138 The CAT’s yearly reports account how 
complainants frequently request preventive protection, particularly in cases concerning 
                                                     
137 The CCPR understands “the same matter” as a complaint relating to the same author, the same facts and the 
same substantive rights. However, facts that have been submitted to another international mechanism can be 
brought before the Committee if: i) the Covenant provides for a broader protection; ii) complaints submitted to 
other international mechanisms have been dismissed by on procedural grounds. 
138 If the complainant wishes the Committee to consider a request for interim measures, he/she should state it 
explicitly, and explain in detail the reasons why such action is necessary. See OHCHR, Fact Sheet No. 17.  
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imminent expulsion or extradition, where they allege a violation of article 3 of the 
Convention.139  
The Committees generally review the merit of the complaint in a closed session, jointly with 
the admissibility assessment. Assessment of the merits is conducted on the basis of (written) 
allegations by the parties, as committees cannot seek independent verification of the facts. 
Both parties are given the opportunity to comment on the counter-party’s allegations within a 
set timeframe. 
Although in some respects the UN individual complaint mechanisms can be qualified as ‘quasi-
judicial’, committee decisions cannot be directly enforced. Rather, decisions present an 
authoritative interpretation of the treaty and contain recommendations for State parties to 
take action based on the case. Where the competent committee finds that a violation has taken 
place, the State party is required to provide information within a particular time frame (e.g. 90 
days for the CAT) on actions taken to implement the recommendations. Committees then 
monitor the follow-up process, and a complaint case remains open until satisfactory measures 
are considered to have been taken. If the State party fails to take appropriate action, the case 
is kept under consideration by the Committee under the follow-up procedure.  
In addition to the individual complaint mechanisms referred to above, the Human Rights 
Council Complaint Procedure (previously known as the 1503 procedure) considers complaints 
submitted to special rapporteurs or working groups of the Human Rights Council. This 
procedure not only addresses complaints submitted by individuals, but also groups or non-
governmental organisations that either represent individuals claiming to have been victims of 
human rights violations, or have direct, reliable knowledge of such violations. 
                                                     
139 See inter alia, Committee against Torture Report to the General Assembly, Fifty-third session (3-28 November 
2014) and Fifty-fourth session (20 April-15 May 2015), A/70/44.  
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3. CROSS-CUTTING ISSUES AFFECTING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF 
COMPLAINT MECHANISMS 
Key findings  
 Most of the internal and external oversight bodies and institutions established in the 11 
CoE countries considered do not meet the existing regional and international standards 
required to qualify as an effective ‘complaint mechanism’. There are clear shortcomings 
in the independence and effective investigative powers of the oversight bodies 
established within the legal and institutional systems considered. These shortcomings 
undermine the capacity of existing administrative bodies to complement the judicial 
oversight that must still be made available at the domestic and supranational level. 
 
 The absence of systematic and independent monitoring of border management activities 
and expulsion operations generates substantial difficulties in documenting and reporting 
abuses and human rights violations. It hinders affected individuals in accessing effective 
complaint procedures and justice. The lack of systematic human rights monitoring and 
reporting mechanisms also hampers the possibility of collecting information and 
generating evidence that can be presented before and assessed by existing complaint 
bodies. To reduce protection gaps, referral and collaboration between monitors and the 
actors responsible for handling complaints should be further developed and strengthened. 
 
 Practical and legal obstacles make it difficult to access existing administrative redress. In 
most of the 11 countries considered, difficulties derive mainly from the lack of 
information about the right to complain, the lack of knowledge of the language of the 
country where the complainant has been exposed to mistreatment, and the lack of legal 
representation or assistance. This is not in line with the level of transparency required for 
a complaint mechanism to satisfy existing international and regional human rights 
standards. The fact that complaints do not have a suspensive effect over actions or 
decisions adopted in the context of border control or border surveillance in most of the 
11 countries analysed also severely limits accessibility to oversight mechanisms. 
 
 The possibility of lodging complaints is also reduced when the complainant is no longer in 
the territory of the country responsible for assessing the human rights responsibilities of 
its border or coast guards. This might occur when the complaint procedures established 
under national law do not allow complaints to be lodged from abroad, or where the 
length of proceedings constitutes a disincentive for foreigners to activate a complaint, 
or when complainants may fear penalisation or negative consequences when presenting 
a complaint. 
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 Poor quality of follow-ups to human rights complaints and limited transparency in the 
assessment of responsibilities also undermine the possibility of obtaining effective 
remedies. Even when they exist, complaint mechanisms that are not fully independent 
from the executive cannot guarantee an adequate level of effectiveness and impartiality 
vis-à-vis the law enforcement authorities being monitored and the human rights 
allegations made against them.  
 
1.3 The need for up-to-standard complaint mechanisms and cross-cutting challenges 
The analysis conducted in the previous sections has made clear that CoE’s State Parties must 
establish dedicated administrative bodies or institutions entrusted with the competence to 
receive human rights complaints. These accountability mechanisms must not only exist, but 
also have the power to investigate and redress abuses suffered by third country nationals in 
the context of border management and expulsion procedures. 
The role of these bodies and institutions is not to substitute other criminal and legal remedies. 
Rather, their function is to offer a form of protection supplementary to the judicial oversight 
systems that must still be made available at the domestic and supranational level. At the same 
time, in order to be qualified as ‘complaint mechanism’, these oversight bodies and institutions 
must meet a series of substantial and procedural standards. Independence, accessibility in 
practice, promptness and thoroughness in follow-up procedures are among the main features 
that an oversight body must possess in order to address the human rights complaints of 
irregular migrants and asylum seekers effectively.  
The research conducted in the framework of this paper has shown that the internal oversight 
bodies established within law enforcement or security apparatuses cannot be qualified as 
‘complaint mechanisms’. In fact, they fail the ‘effectiveness test’ on account of their lack of 
impartiality and transparency, and due to the large margin of discretion left to the competent 
authorities as to whether and how to follow up the complaints received. On the other hand, 
the actual features and exact role played by different Ombudspersons, Human Rights 
Institutions, and other accountability bodies varies significantly across the 11 countries 
considered. Furthermore, it has been observed how different human rights accountability 
regimes apply to the multitude of law enforcement authorities currently performing border 
management and/or expulsion-related tasks. 
Despite this fragmented landscape, a series of cross-cutting challenges have been identified as 
affecting the effectiveness of the accountability bodies and procedures created to address 
fundamental rights violations that might occur in the context of border control, border 
surveillance and return operations. The following cross-cutting challenges are broadly 
identified and presented in the following paragraphs. 
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1.1.3 Weak links between independent monitoring and complaint mechanisms 
If the use of violence or disproportionate force by law enforcement and other security players 
has traditionally represented one of the most challenging forms of abuse of power that require 
tackling, a further set of legal and practical obstacles hampers individuals and organisations in 
activating complaint mechanisms in the context of border control, border surveillance and 
return operations. In the first place, the multiplication of security players operating in the field 
of border and immigration management poses serious challenges in terms of who is 
responsible for what (and responsibility often shifts in cases where incidents take place) and a 
consistent implementation of existing human rights and administrative standards. In particular, 
it emerged how the various actors currently participating in border control, border surveillance 
and/or expulsion operations are not captured by the same oversight and accountability 
systems. 
The overview of the multiplicity of law enforcement actors currently participating in the 
surveillance of the EU’s external borders, or coordinating the implementation of joint return 
flights of irregular migrants, has shown that the complaint mechanisms available to individuals 
varies significantly, and remains by and large extremely limited in practice. This means that 
different complaint procedures can be activated depending not only on the specific authority 
to which the agent that adopted the action or decision leading to a human rights abuse is 
affiliated (e.g. national police forces, coast guards, military, or civilians including doctors, 
private security companies, etc.), but also on the type of mission and/or framework of 
cooperation within which the action or decision leading to a fundamental rights infringement 
was adopted (e.g. Frontex joint operation, CDSP activities, international cooperation falling 
outside EU law, etc.).  
Further accountability challenges derive from the specific contexts in which border control, 
border surveillance, and expulsion procedures take place. The absence of a systematic 
independent monitoring of border control and surveillance activities, including those 
performed in remote and unsafe contexts such as the blue and green borders inside and 
outside state territories, not only generates substantial difficulties in documenting and 
reporting abuses, but also hinders the possibility of collecting information and generating the 
necessary evidence to bring to the attention of existing complaint bodies. The establishment of 
strong links between independent monitoring and independent complaint bodies appears 
therefore to constitute an essential precondition for preventing and redressing human rights 
abuses and for complaint mechanisms to be effective. 
While performing different functions, monitoring actors and complaint mechanisms have the 
objective of ensuring that the protection standards granted to aliens under international and 
regional human rights law and national legislation are not merely formal, but ‘effective’ and 
‘practical’. For example, a monitoring body may be in possession of information that provides 
grounds for commencing a complaint procedure, or that might be central to the investigations 
in that respect. In these situations, referral and collaboration between monitors and the actors 
responsible for handling complaints (including civil society organisations specialised in access 
to legal aid) constitute a critical element to ensuring the accountability of law enforcement 
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authorities and other state actors, especially if the monitoring body encounters resistance with 
regard to the implementation of its recommendations. 
However, the protection gaps that the absence of independent human rights monitors 
generates in terms of accessibility to complaint mechanisms and effective investigations are 
likely to widen. This appears evident not only from the latest policy initiatives directed at the 
policing (if not the criminalisation) of civil society actors operating in the field,140 but also from 
the increasing adoption of exceptional measures (such as the reintroduction of internal 
Schengen borders checks), offensive border management infrastructures (e.g. barbed-wired 
fences on the Hungarian-Serbian border), 141 and legalisation of ‘push-backs’ of asylum seekers 
in countries like Spain.142  
Also, for cases of human rights violations occurring in the context of expulsion operations, and 
in particular during the implementation of joint return flights, the possibility of activating 
complaint mechanisms is undermined by the lack of a systematic and truly independent 
monitoring system. In this regard, it must be noted how EU law prescribes precise indications 
as to the standards that a monitoring mechanism must possess in order to qualify as effective, 
at least in the field of forced return. In fact, pursuant to Article 8(6) of the Return Directive,143 
MS must identify and appoint independent forced-return monitors (i.e. not by an agency 
belonging to the branch of government responsible for return). The latter must be granted 
effective access to all return operations and not only perform its function ad hoc. As such, 
monitors are required to be present, assist and report on actual and potential operational and 
structural shortcomings affecting return operations and thereby reduce the risks of human 
rights abuses.144 
At the same time, the FRA overview of the state of play in 28 EU Member States shows that, to 
date, there are still four states where effective forced return monitoring systems are not in 
place.145 For instance, interviews conducted in the framework of this book with representatives 
of EU institutions and officials of EU agencies confirmed that independent monitors were only 
                                                     
140 See Ansa, “NGO migrant rescue ship seized, 3 probed: ProActiva Open Arms at centre of new investigation”, 
19.03.2018.  
141 See S. Carrera, M. Stefan et al. (2018), “The Future of the Schengen Area: Latest Developments and Challenges 
in the Schengen Governance Framework since 2016”, op. cit., pp. 25-36. 
142 In Spain, so-called expresses expulsion procedures are being actively executed by police forces that return 
migrants and potential asylum seekers in the country of transit without court hearing, without placing the 
foreigner in detention, without legal defence and within the delay of 72 hours.  
143 For example, Article 8(6) of the EU Return Directive requires Member States to provide for an “effective forced-
return monitoring system”. The rationale of the provision is to make monitoring of forced return operation 
automatic in order to avoid that some people are wrongfully returned. The objective, to ensure that European 
human rights and fundamental freedom standards are respected during forced returns operations. 
144 Other conditions for an effective monitoring mechanism entails: the duty to immediately inform monitors of 
impending return operations; sufficient funding; cooperation between all stakeholders; monitors should be able 
to decide which cases to monitor; observation duties may be extended to the review of medical files; monitors 
should facilitate “constructive work relationships” with enforcement authorities; monitoring reports should be 
systematically taken into account by the authorities. 
145 See FRA (2016), Forced return monitoring systems – State of play in 28 EU Member States (updated 26/4/2016). 
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present in 54% of joint return operations supported by Frontex. Interviews conducted for the 
purposes of this book also revealed that in some EU countries the development of an up-to-
standards monitoring system was delayed because of the fact that the legal framework at the 
national level prevented the appointment of monitoring bodies not affiliated or recognised by 
the country’s governmental authorities. This means that, depending on the specific EU country 
from where migrants are returned, their rights will not be safeguarded in a consistent way. 
1.2.3 Accessibility, adequacy and effective follow up  
By ratifying or acceding to the ECHR, State Parties accept the Convention’s system of 
compulsory jurisdiction. The latter is based on the power of the European Court of Human 
Rights (ECtHR) to issue legally binding judgements on cases concerning violations of the human 
rights set forth in the ECHR.146 Based on articles 33 and 34, the Court can receive complaints 
from both NGOs and individuals. 
Any individual who alleges having been the victim of a violation of a right encompassed in the 
ECHR within the jurisdiction of a State Party is entitled to lodge an application with the Court. 
The ECHR requires certain conditions to be met in order for applications to be admissible. The 
main admissibility requirements include inter alia the subsistence of a (direct or indirect) victim 
status (Article 34 ECHR) and the prior exhaustion of domestic remedies (Article 35 para 1 
ECHR).147 The ‘exhaustion of domestic remedies’ requirement implies the existence and 
previous activation of available redress mechanisms provided at the national level for the ECHR 
violation involved in the complaint. This is based on the assumption, reflected in Article 13 
ECHR, that State Parties grant the possibility for a complaint to be brought before: a relevant 
civil, criminal, or administrative court or body, followed by an appeal where applicable, and 
even a further appeal to a higher court such as a Supreme Court or Constitutional court, if one 
exists. 
As the Court has stressed, this requirement is intrinsic to the subsidiary nature of the 
Convention machinery,148 and constitutes an indispensable part of the functioning of its 
protection system, which applies regardless of whether the ECHR’s provisions have been 
transposed into national law.149 The importance of establishing domestic remedies to ensure 
‘effective’ protection of fundamental rights standards in the scope of the ECHR, and more 
                                                     
146 Whereas the Court issues a final judgment on the existence of a violation of the Convention, the respondent 
State, and sometimes even other States, are often required to take legislative or other regulatory measures to 
comply with the Court’s judgment and the domestic courts to adapt their case-law. Judgments may also impose 
payment of just satisfaction to the applicants and/or adoption of concrete measures in order to redress the 
violations found (e.g. release from custody, re-opening of proceedings, restitution of property). The Committee of 
Ministers of the Council of Europe supervises the correct execution of the Court’s judgments.  
147 Other admissibility criteria include: application cannot be lodged under a false name or by falsifying documents, 
or using an abusive language (article 35 para 3 ECHR); the same application cannot have already been submitted 
to the Strasbourg Court, or lodged before an international body such as the UN Human Rights Committee (article 
35 para 2 ECHR).  
148 ECtHR (GC), Demopoulos and Others v. Turkey, Admissibility Decision, 01.03.2010, para 69 and 97. 
149 ECtHR, Eberhard and M. v. Slovenia, 01.12.2009. 
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specifically in the context of border control, border surveillance and expulsion operations, has 
also been stressed by other CoE human rights institutions and bodies. These include, in 
particular, the CPT, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, and the 
Commissioner for Human Rights, which are responsible for monitoring the implementation of 
existing CoE human rights instruments and contributing to the right of petition under the ECHR. 
The analysis of the standards applying to the field of border control, border surveillance and 
expulsions as provided for in EU primary and secondary legislation, and progressively 
interpreted by the CJEU has also clarified what an effective complaint mechanism should look 
like. Domestic remedies must not only exist, but should also be accessible in practice, be 
capable of ensuring independent and thorough investigations and providing redress in respect 
of the applicant’s allegation, and offer a reasonable prospect of success. In determining 
whether any particular remedy meets these effectiveness standards (i.e. existence, 
independence adequacy, and availability), regard must be given to the particular circumstances 
of the individual case. As illustrated in this book, the ECtHR has also stressed that a remedy 
cannot be considered effective when it depends on the exercise of discretion by an 
intermediary and is not directly accessible to the applicant.150 
At the same time, a series of shortcomings emerge when looking at the complaint mechanisms 
existing in the 11 countries under consideration. The information collected through desk 
research and the inputs provided by the national and legal experts from the 11 countries who 
contributed to this research through the e-questionnaire and expert workshop clearly shows 
that the extent to which complaint procedures are accessible in practice is significantly reduced 
by different factors, notably the lack of information available to complainants about their right 
to complain and the heavily bureaucratic procedures for lodging complaints.  
Other obstacles to accessibility arise from the lack of knowledge of the language of the country 
where the complainant has been exposed to mistreatment and the lack of legal representation 
or assistance.151 The individuals concerned are also often deprived of the material possibility to 
access legal aid (which is usually provided by civil society actors), due to the fact that they do 
not possess or have been deprived by the police of mobile phones or mobile phone batteries, 
or because even the issuing of entry permits to border areas by state authorities takes a 
considerable amount of time. A key means for ensuring accessibility would be finding other 
ways and procedures to lodge complaints such as oral complaints – not necessarily in a formal 
or written form, so as to make the entire procedure simpler and more user-friendly for 
complainants. 
More generally, the responses to the e-questionnaire and the discussions during the expert 
seminar demonstrated that legal aid is particularly difficult to obtain when the individual 
affected by a human rights violation has already been expelled, pushed back, or is no longer 
physically present in the country.152 This poses a profound challenge for the practicable delivery 
                                                     
150 ECtHR (GC), Tănase v. Moldova, 27.04.2010. 
151 Expert replies from Austria, Bulgaria, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Poland, Romania and Spain. 
152 Expert replies from Greece, Hungary and Spain. 
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of the ‘portable responsibility’ inherent to MS compliance with the fundamental human rights 
obligations studied in this book. In Italy, for instance, immigrants and asylum seekers often run 
the risk of being expelled even before they are given the possibility of lodging an asylum 
application. Identifying and tracking back the victim of a human rights violation who has been 
refused entry, pushed back, or expelled are difficult as a result. The complexity and costs 
involved in reaching out to undocumented victims of abuses after they have left a country’s 
territory often lead to the expiry of the terms prescribed by national law to lodge a complaint.153 
In some countries, and in Italy and Spain in particular, the activation of complaints was only 
possible because certain NGOs providing legal aid to migrants and asylum seekers actively 
searched for the victims of abuses and witnesses in their countries of origin or return. E-
questionnaire responses confirmed the key role played by civil society in ensuring the 
effectiveness of instruments for monitoring, reporting and redress, including bringing violations 
before justice. Priority should be given to ensuring access to civil society actors to relevant sites 
and wherever border controls/surveillance and joint expulsion flights take place. 
To a very large extent, difficulties related to the accessibility of complaint mechanisms also arise 
from the fact that, in most of the 11 countries analysed, complaints do not have a suspensive 
effect over actions or decisions adopted in the context of border control or surveillance. In EU 
MS, complaints against return decisions do have a suspensive effect, although this can be 
excluded on the ground of exceptions, such as for instance the threat of imminent danger for 
public security that might derive from the presence of an alien in the territory of the state. Also, 
in some countries it seems that the authorities entitled to review the return/removal order are 
not an independent judicial authority. Furthermore, in some cases complaints procedures can 
only be lodged if the complainant is physically present on the territory of the county.154 And 
even then, access to effective complaint procedures is not systematically granted. Legal 
practitioners from Italy have recently reported a case where the only means left to third 
country nationals to avoid their return to a country where a risk of inhuman and degrading 
treatment exists (i.e. Sudan), was to physically resist their deportation on board the flight.155  
Several expert respondents to the e-questionnaire indicated the length of proceedings as a 
disincentive to foreigners activating a complaint.156 Litigation takes time. This contradicts the 
requirement according to which, in order to be effective, a complaint mechanism should not 
only be accessible, but also provide for prompt and expeditious and yet thorough investigation 
and handling of the case. During border control land surveillance operations and expulsion 
procedures, the possibility of collecting the information required to document abuses remains 
very limited. Documenting human rights violations (such as for instance physical violence or 
mistreatment) represents an additional challenge undermining the ability of victims of abuses 
                                                     
153 Expert replies from Austria, Spain and Italy. 
154 Expert reply from Slovakia. 
155 See Statewatch, Italy/Sudan: ASGI and ARCI appeal against mass deportation to Sudan deemed admissible by 
the ECtHR, 12.01.2018. 
156 Expert replies from Hungary and Poland. 
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to lodge a complaint and obtain an effective remedy. The independence of personnel carrying 
out medical checks is therefore of central importance.  
National experts highlighted that an additional challenge is the fact that the anonymity of 
potential victims is not always guaranteed. However, these individuals may well be in fear of 
reprisal and intimidation if their identity were to become known. Third country nationals usually 
dismay authorities and do not want to engage in formal complaint procedures – their priority 
is ‘to make it’ (cross the border and reach their desired destination), not to submit a claim which 
may potentially jeopardise their journeys and dreams. The specific needs of vulnerable groups 
(such as minors, persons affected by disability, LGBT, etc.) are not properly taken into 
consideration, which constitutes another area of concern across the countries investigated. 
The lack of independent monitoring in the context, for instance, of border surveillance at sea 
does not only mean that the material protection of the rights of third country nationals has to 
rely exclusively on the good conduct of the police or border authorities. The lack of 
documentation that affects in particular (but not exclusively) incidents that occur in the context 
of border surveillance also makes it difficult for prosecutors (and other similarly entitled judicial 
or quasi-judicial actors) to start ex officio complaint procedures regarding a human rights 
violation that might have occurred during the conduct of border control, border surveillance, 
or joint return flights.157 
In at least two of the countries considered in this book, namely Turkey and Hungary, the 
difficulty of obtaining a proper remedy is also linked to the lack of adequate investigations by 
the authority responsible for handling complaints. In the case of Turkey, the overall 
transparency of the procedures related, for instance, to complaints brought against 
deportation orders is furthermore undermined by the fact that the decisions of the 
administrative courts responsible for deciding such cases are not made public. Recent socio-
legal analysis shows that even in EU MS such as Italy (quasi)-judicial remedies provided by the 
so-called “Giudice di Pace” against, for instance, arbitrary detention of migrants and asylum 
seekers are of poor quality.158 
                                                     
157 In most of the 11 countries covered, an investigation related to human rights violations occurring in the context 
of border control border surveillance and /or expulsion operations starts ex officio when the incident is qualified 
as a criminal offence under national legislation. 
158 See, for instance, F. Mastromartino, E. Rigo and M. Veglio (2017), “Lexium, Osservatorio sulla Giurisprudenza 
in meteria di Immigrazione del Giudice di Pace: Sintesi Rapport 2015”, in Diritto, Immigrazione e Cittadinanza,  
Facicolo N. 2/2017. 
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CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
This book has highlighted the importance for CoE State Parties of ensuring effective complaint 
mechanisms for alleged human rights violations in the context of border management and joint 
return flights. It has provided evidence substantiating the existence of structural and functional 
shortcomings affecting existing instruments and bodies established at the international, 
regional as well as national level to deal with human rights violations at international borders, 
or in the context of expulsion procedures. In light of the findings obtained through the analysis, 
the following set of conclusions can be drawn:  
 First, independent human rights monitoring is lacking in the context of border control 
procedures and border surveillance activities. Independent monitoring mechanisms 
also need to be strengthened in the framework of expulsion procedures, and in 
particular in the context of joint removal operations. Such monitoring systems are 
especially necessary in ensuring a systematic implementation of the right of good 
administration. As no ‘Border Monitor’ exists at the CoE level, sufficient human and 
financial resources need to be allocated to overcoming obstacles that arise from the 
current fragmentation in the monitoring systems of different states. Independent 
monitoring of all Frontex operational activities is also not ensured. Representatives of 
the Frontex Consultative Forum are not systematically present at relevant sites where 
‘control’ takes place, including on the high seas and in third countries. Even when 
evidence of human rights violations is provided, the Frontex Executive Director is not 
under the obligation to suspend the operations concerned. Furthermore, the FRO does 
not have the power to monitor the follow-up of the complaint by the relevant 
authorities in MS, and cannot bring the issue before the European Ombudsman in cases 
of inadequate follow-up. 
 Second, systematic access to legal aid and a lawyer is not fully ensured. CoE State Parties 
appear not to be fulfilling their commitment to full access and provision of information 
to relevant civil society and international organisations so as to ensure and strengthen 
access to legal aid. Also, the lack of a systematic monitoring system undermines the 
provision of information about the availability of national and supranational avenues for 
complaints and makes it difficult for individuals affected by a human rights violation to 
liaise with existing complaint institutions or bodies. At the EU level, further guidance is 
needed to ensure that the standards set forth in the EU Directive on Victims of Crime159 
are extended to and also applicable in the scope of border control/surveillance and 
expulsion procedures. 
                                                     
159 Directive 2012/29/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2012 establishing minimum 
standards on the rights, support and protection of victims of crime, and replacing Council Framework Decision 
2001/220/JHA. 
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 Third, legal and procedural obstacles reduce the availability in practice of complaint 
mechanisms. In particular, the possibility to lodge anonymous complaints is often not 
guaranteed to victims of human rights abuses. This often translates into disincentives 
to activating complaint procedures by the individuals concerned, as third country 
nationals fear reprisals, as well as confiscation of personal assets and belongings. 
Moreover, the inadmissibility of oral complaints prevents third county nationals from 
activating formal complaint procedures at the moment when the actual human rights 
abuse takes place. Also, complaints against push-back decisions do not have a 
suspensive effect. In some cases, a suspensive effect is also lacking for complaints 
lodged against return decisions. In cases where a push-back happens despite a 
complaint being raised, the state implementing the refoulement is not currently under 
a clear obligation to accept the affected individual back. 
 Fourth, a system of portable justice, analogous to those already developed, for instance 
in the US,160 does not exist at the European level. Those whose fundamental human 
rights have been violated during border controls and return processes are not 
systematically monitored and are extremely difficult to contact for prosecutors, human 
rights institutions and NGOs providing legal aid. This significantly undermines the ability 
of victims to testify against perpetrators of crimes and human rights violations (for 
instance, through video channels). Civil society actors have a key role to play in the 
implementation of this system, but require financial support in order to become more 
active. This would also permit better monitoring of standards implementation and 
compliance with and execution of ECtHR landmark judgments by CoE State Parties. The 
establishment of public interest complaints could also be envisaged. The use of oral 
complaints and of electronic tools would in particular allow affected individuals to 
report violations and lodged complaints before, during and after return. For this 
purpose, the development of user-friendly electronic tools could be considered, for 
instance in the form of mobile applications, but also by the creation of dedicated 
Internet pages making electronic complaint forms available in different languages. 
 Fifth, reporting and registering of incidents occurring in border operations and expulsion-
related activities is not ensured. Not all personnel who carry out border control, border 
surveillance and return operations are always clearly identifiable to migrants by means 
of names or personnel numbers. This makes reporting human rights violations to 
competent authorities more difficult. Aggregated and disaggregated data on human 
rights incidents are not comprehensively collected, while their collection would not only 
facilitate effective and thorough investigations with a view to understanding causes, 
and sanctioning and preventing such practices, but also protect staff against unfounded 
allegations. Data protection-compliant video recordings systems could be provided in 
order, in particular in the context of border surveillance and joint return flights, to 
                                                     
160 Similar examples have been developed in the field of labour migration law by the Global Workers Justice 
Alliance (New Name: Justice in Motion) and Centro de Derechos del Migrante (Mexico): Network of Lawyers 
Example of countries in Central America. 
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gather evidence of instances of excessive use of force, assault and other forms of 
violence, torture, ill treatment, and any other human rights violations and abuses 
perpetrated by border authorities and private actors. These recordings should be 
available for periods of time commensurate with the usual length of procedures for 
lodging complaints so that they can be used to substantiate allegations of human rights 
violations. 
 Sixth, limited powers and independence of complaint bodies and human rights 
institutions prevent an effective follow-up of complaints. Also, cooperation between 
NHRIs and international bodies such as the CPT and UN Human Rights Treaty Bodies 
such as the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) remain to date 
rather limited. Enhanced cooperation among national, regional and international 
human rights institutions could increase the effectiveness of these bodies and 
institutions as they carry out field visits, receive and consider direct complaints from 
victims of human rights violations, and appeal to governments on behalf of victims. At 
the EU level, the Frontex Fundamental Rights Officer, should be endowed with greater 
human resources, and mandated with a wider power to conduct thorough and 
systematic follow-up monitoring of national complaints, thereby enabling Frontex to 
properly monitor how human rights complaints are followed up domestically by the 
responsible institutions established at the national and/or local level. 
 Seventh, need for clearer human rights obligations in the field of complaints mechanisms. 
To date, the CoE Committee of Ministers’ 20 Guidelines on Forced Returns provide only 
limited indications as to the operational standards to be respected by CoE State Parties 
in order to ensure access to effective complaint mechanisms. The role and 
responsibilities of medical staff in the framework of forced returns also needs to be 
better defined, especially in relation to the assessment of the “fit to fly” status of 
returnees. Furthermore, indications as to the practical measures to be undertaken by 
authorities of CoE countries in order to ensure third country nationals access to 
effective complaint mechanisms are completely lacking when it comes to border 
surveillance activities and third country cooperation. A new set of comprehensive 
guidelines could therefore be developed and also tailored in a way that would take the 
special needs of vulnerable groups such as children or person with disabilities more 
thoroughly into account. This should go hand-to-hand with the increase of financial 
support, for instance from the EU budget, for the work of civil society actors specialised 
in access to justice and rights, and currently acting as watchdogs or human rights 
monitors when EU Agencies perform tasks in third countries. This aspect is particularly 
relevant as investigative field work is proving to be an essential tool for documenting 
human rights abuses in remote or third country locations. 
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ANNEX 1.  
OVERVIEW OF THE AUTHORITIES PERFORMING BORDER CONTROL AND 
EXPULSIONS-RELATED DUTIES IN THE 11 COE COUNTRIES IN THIS 
STUDY161 
Country Authority Functions/competences 
Austria Austrian National Police - 
Border control and Aliens 
Police (Ministry of Interior) 
 Border control at border crossing points 
 Border surveillance 
 Apprehension and returns162  
Military (Ministry of Defense)  Participates in border surveillance duties in support of 
the police 
Bulgaria Border Police and Migration 
Directorate (Ministry of 
Interior) 
 Border control at border crossing points 
 Border surveillance 
 Apprehension and returns 
Navy (Ministry of 
Defence) 
 Contributing to maritime border control and 
surveillance and search and rescue operations 
Greece Hellenic Police (Border Police 
Units) 
 Border control (illegal migration as well as cross-border 
crime) 
 Border surveillance 
 Apprehension and returns 
Hellenic Coast Guard  Border control 
 Border surveillance  
Hellenic Navy (Ministry of 
Defence) 
 Border surveillance at sea 
Hungary Border Guard   Border control 
 Border surveillance 
National Police (Immigration 
and Asylum Office) 
 Border control 
 Border surveillance 
 Apprehension and returns  
Customs   Development and maintenance of the land border 
crossing points with Ukraine, Serbia-Montenegro, 
Croatia and Romania  
Italy Border Police (Ministry of 
Interior) 
 Border control and immigration management (land 
borders, sea borders and air borders) 
                                                     
161 The overview is based on information collected though desk research, and the inputs received by experts and 
practitioners from the 11 countries covered in this book. For a complete list of the authorities that, at the EU level, 
are currently assigned with tasks related to the implementation of the Schengen acquis, see List of national 
services responsible for border-controls for the purposes of Article 15(2) of Regulation (EC) No 562/2006 of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 2006 establishing a Community Code on the rules governing 
the movement of persons across borders (Schengen Borders Code), 2006/C 247/02. 
162 Except when the matter falls under the competence of the BFA. 
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 Border surveillance and patrolling (sea borders)163  
 Expulsions (enforcing forced removals) 
Tax and Custom Police 
(Ministry of Finance) 
 Border control functions (land, air, sea borders) 
Carabinieri (Ministry of 
Defence)  
 Border control functions (land, air, sea borders) 
Coastguard (Ministry of 
Transportation and 
Infrastructure) 
 Border surveillance (including preventing and 
countering “illegal trade in migrants”, coordination of 
rescue operations at sea164) in territorial waters and 
contiguous zones. 
 Border control (the Harbour Offices)  
Navy (Ministry of Defence)  Border surveillance of international waters  
Poland Polish Border Guard  Border control functions at EU external border crossing 
points (land and air)  
 Border patrol of the sections of the Polish state border 
forming the EU/Schengen external border.  
National Police  Apprehension and returns 
Romania Romanian Border Police  Border control 
 Border surveillance 
 Apprehension and returns 
Serbia Border Police (Ministry of 
Interior) 
 Border control 
 Border surveillance 
 Apprehension and returns (coordinated by the 
Directorate of Administration of the Serbian Ministry of 
Interior) 
Army (Ministry of Defence)  Border surveillance 
Spain Guardia Civil (Ministry of 
Interior and Ministry of 
Defence) 
 Border control  
 Border surveillance 
National Police (Ministry of 
Interior) 
 Apprehension and returns 
Slovakia Alien Police (Ministry of 
Interior) 
 Border control  
 Border surveillance  
 Expulsion of aliens, readmission 
Turkey Police Directorates (Ministry 
of Interior) 
 Border control (Directorate General of Security) 
 Border surveillance (Directorate General of Security) 
 Apprehension and Returns (Directorate General for 
Migration Management) 
Gendarmerie General 
Command - Border Units 
(Turkish Armed Forces) 
 Border control 
 Border surveillance 
Coast Guard Command 
(Turkish Armed Forces) 
 Border control (sea borders) 
 Border surveillance (including search and rescue) 
                                                     
163 Police officials transmit all information and data concerning vessels suspected of migrant smuggling to the 
Department of Public Security (Central Directorate of Immigration and Border Police), which performs 
coordination tasks. 
164 The responsibility entrusted to the Italian Coast Guard for performing search and rescue operations does not 
exclude the carrying out of police activities by the same authority in parallel. 
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ANNEX 2.  
OVERVIEW OF THE INSTITUTIONS COMPETENT TO RECEIVE HUMAN 
RIGHTS COMPLAINTS (NON-JUDICIAL) IN THE 11 COE COUNTRIES IN 
THIS STUDY165 
Country Institution Function/competence 
Austria Austrian Ombudsman 
Board  (NHRI – B) 
 Complaints against the police regarding injustices or 
maladministration with asylum procedures, visas, 
settlement procedures or the rights of foreigners. 
 Complaints against direct orders issued and coercive 
measures carried out during police operations such as 
large-scale raids. 
 Own investigations on abuses committed during forced 
returns of individuals. 
Bulgaria Ombudsman of the 
Republic of Bulgaria 
(NHRI – B) 
 Complaints about human rights violations in the context of 
border control and border surveillance activities, and return 
operations. Including complaints by foreign nationals about 
abuses of rights or freedoms at the hands of any public 
authority. 
National Commission 
for Combating Traffic 
in Human Beings 
 Complaints related to human rights violations occurring in 
the context of border control, border surveillance, and/or 
return operations. 
Greece The Greek 
Ombudsperson 
(Human Rights 
Department) 
 Complaints regarding violations of the rights of 
immigrants; right to political asylum and rights to entry 
and residence of aliens; personal freedom; discrimination 
on grounds of nationality or ethnic origin; infringements of 
the right to appeal to administrative authorities and to 
access to judicial protection. 
Hungary The Office of the 
Commissioner for 
Fundamental Rights 
(NRHI - A) 
 Complaints regarding fundamental rights violations or 
imminent danger of violation by a public authority (e.g. 
Hungarian defence forces; law enforcement actors, or a 
body acting under the authority of another body) 
including in the context of border control and return 
operations. 
Italy National Guarantor 
for Person Deprived of 
Liberty 
 NA 
“Giudice di Pace”  Complaints against expulsion orders. 
Poland Commissioner for 
Human Rights (NHRI - 
A) 
 Complaints related to the freedom and human rights 
specified in the Constitution and other normative acts 
from any person requesting for assistance in protecting 
                                                     
165 The overview is based on information collected though desk research and the inputs received from experts and 
practitioners from the 11 countries covered in this book. 
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their freedoms or rights from infringement by public 
authorities. 
Romania Romanian 
Ombudsman  
 Complaints submitted by individuals harmed by violations 
of their rights and freedoms by public administration 
authorities. Including complaints related to mistreatments 
in the context of border control, border surveillance and 
expulsion procedures at the hands of public authorities.  
Serbia Ombudsman of the 
Republic of Serbia, 
(NHRI – A) 
 Receive, investigate, assess complaints regarding cases of 
human rights violations deriving from border control, 
border surveillance, or return operations conducted by 
agents of the Police.  
Slovakia Office Of The Public 
Defender Of Rights 
(Ombudsman) 
(NHRI - B) 
 Complaints about human rights violations in the context of 
border controls, border surveillance and returns. 
 Complaints might be related to detention decisions, 
decisions to refuse entry, decisions on return, decisions to 
ban entry, excessive use of force, ill/treatment. 
Spain Ombudsman 
(Defensor del Pueblo) 
(NHRI – A) 
 Complaints by foreigners related to fundamental rights 
violations through administrative actions or decisions of 
anybody within the General Administration, including the 
police.  
Regional Ombudsman 
(e.g. Síndic de 
Greuges, Ararteko, 
Valedor do Pobo) 
 Complaints on matters under their responsibility (e.g. 
regional police, autonomous communities, prisons). 
NGOs, associations 
and Lawyers´ Bar 
Associations 
 Can receive complaints, and they can communicate them 
to the Prosecutors Office (Fiscalía). 
Turkey Turkish Ombudsman  NA 
Human Rights and 
Equality Institution of 
Turkey (NHRI - C) 
 NA 
 
 Border control, surveillance operations and expulsion of irregular immigrants 
– particularly through return flights – can pose serious human rights 
challenges. This book examines whether Europe is properly equipped to 
ensure effective access to remedies for alleged rights violations or possible 
abuses of force against immigrants and asylum seekers. 
It sheds light on the fragmentation of the human rights accountability regimes 
and shows that while the ‘law on the books’ may formally recognise a set of 
fundamental rights for immigrants and asylum seekers, the ‘law in practice’ 
does not necessarily offer adequate complaint mechanisms in many European 
countries. Finally, the book sets out a number of policy recommendations, 
paying particular attention to addressing human rights accountability issues 
in the context of activities undertaken by the new European Border and Coast 
Guard (Frontex). 
 
